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SCRUTINIZING THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Adam Winkler*
One overlooked issue in the voluminous literature on the Second Amend-
ment is what standard of review should apply to gun control if the
Amendment is read to protect an individual right to bear arms. This lack of
attention may be due to the assumption that strict scrutiny would necessar-
ily apply because the right would be "fundamental" or because the right is
located in the Bill of Rights. In this Article, Professor Winkler challenges
that assumption and considers the arguments for a contrary conclusion:
that the Second Amendment's individual right to bear arms is appropri-
ately governed by a deferential, reasonableness review under which nearly
all gun control laws would survive judicial review. Professor Winkler's dis-
cussion is informed by the example of state constitutional law, where the
individual right to bear arms is already well established. Forty-two states
have constitutional provisions guaranteeing an individual right to bear
arms and, tellingly, every state to consider the question applies a deferen-
tial reasonable regulation standard in arms rights cases. No state applies
strict scrutiny or any other type of heightened review to gun laws. Since
World War I1, the state courts have authored hundreds of opinions using
the reasonable regulation test to determine the constitutionality of all sorts
of gun control laws. All but a fraction of these decisions uphold gun con-
trol laws as reasonable measures to protect public safety. If the federal
courts follow this universal practice of the state courts and apply the rea-
sonable regulation standard, nearly all gun control laws will survive
judicial review. Moreover as Professor Winkler argues, even if the federal
courts decide to apply strict scrutiny, most weapons laws might still be up-
held due to the overwhelming governmental interest in public safety. If so,
then any eventual triumph of the individual-rights reading of the Second
Amendment is likely to be more symbolic than substantive.
* Acting Professor, UCLA School of Law. Thanks to Iman Anabtawi, Jack Beard, Saul
Comell, Robert Goldstein, Mark Greenberg, Lisa Griffin, Pam Karlan, Gia Lee, Russell Robinson,
Gary Rowe, Eugene Volokh, and Noah Zatz. Craig Countryman and Julie Axelrod provided excel-




I. WHOSE STANDARD IS THIS ANYWAY? ..................................... 689
A . Implem enting Rights .......................................................... 689
B. Standards in Second Amendment
Law and Literature ............................................................ 690
II. SCRUTINIZING THE ARGUMENTS FOR
SECOND AMENDMENT STRICT SCRUTINY ................................ 693
A. The Bill of Rights Argument .............................................. 693
B. The Fundamental Rights Argument ................................... 696
C. Theories of Strict Scrutiny ................................................. 700
1. Invidious Motive Theory of Strict Scrutiny ................. 700
2. Cost-Benefit Theory of Strict Scrutiny ........................ 703
D. Strict Scrutiny in the States ............................................... 705
Ill. TOWARD A REASONABLE SECOND AMENDMENT ..................... 706
A . Text .................................................................................... 706
B . H istory ............................................................................... 708
C . Structure ............................................................................ 7 12
IV. THE PRACTICE OF REASON ....................................................... 715
A. The Reasonable Regulation Standard ............................... 716
B. The Breadth of Deference .................................................. 719
1. Bans on Particular Types of Weapons ......................... 720
2. Felon Possession Bans ................................................ 721
3. Licensing Law s ........................................................... 722
C. The Limits of Reasonableness ........................................... 722
V. RECONSIDERING HEIGHTENED
SECOND AMENDMENT SCRUTINY ............................................. 726
A' Second Amendment Strict Scrutiny Applied ...................... 727
B. A Brief Note on Intermediate Scrutiny .............................. 731
C ON CLU SIO N ......................................................................................... 732
INTRODUCTION
The lively debate over the Second Amendment has focused on whether
it protects a right of individuals to possess arms or a collective right of states
to maintain militias free from federal interference.' The last Supreme Court
1. For the individual-rights view, see STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE
ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (1984); JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP
AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1261-62, 1264-66 (1992); Sanford
Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989); Nelson Lund, The Sec-
ond Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103 (1987);
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461 (1995);
and William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Bear Arms, 43 DUKE
L.J. 1236 (1994).
For the collective-rights view, of which there are several variants, see H. RICHARD UVILLER &
WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT
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decision to address the issue was way back in 1939, when in United States v.
Miller2 the Court indicated that the Second Amendment guaranteed a collec-
tive right of states rather than an individual right.3 Much recent legal
scholarship has critiqued the collective-rights view and argued that the
amendment was intended to protect an individual "right to possess firearms
for personal self-defense and the defense of others. 4 Over the past few
years, the individual-rights view has won over at least one federal circuit
court5 and has become the official position of the Bush Administration's
Department of Justice.6 It is clear that the individual-rights reading of the
Second Amendment is gaining headway in American legal thought.7
Mostly overlooked in the literature, however, is the important question
of what standard of review would apply to laws burdening the right to bear
arms if the Court were to adopt the individual-rights approach.8 No right is
absolute, and the extent to which legislation can permissibly burden a right
is largely determined by the doctrinal rules, tests, and other devices the
Court adopts to "implement" the right.9 One prominent way of implementing
constitutional mandates is a standard of review, such as strict scrutiny or
rational basis, which is used to judge the constitutionality of laws burdening
the right. Yet in the Second Amendment literature, there has been little
FELL SILENT (2002); Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 309 (1998); Saul Cornell, A New Paradigm for the Second Amendment, 22 LAW & HIST.
REV. 161 (2004); Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction
of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57, 58 (1995); and David Thomas Konig, The Second
Amendment: A Missing Transatlantic Context for the Historical Meaning of "the Right of the People
to Keep and BearArms," 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 119, 154-57 (2004).
2. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
3. United States v. Cole, 276 F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D.D.C. 2003) ("The Miller decision was
the last time the Supreme Court considered the meaning of the Second Amendment, and for over six
decades since, the lower federal courts have uniformly interpreted the decision as holding that the
Amendment affords 'a collective, rather than individual, right' associated with the maintenance of a
regulated militia." (quoting Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
813, 116 (1995))).
4. Calvin Massey, Elites, Identity Politics, Guns, and the Manufacture of Legal Rights, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 573, 587 (2004).
5. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001).
6. Brief for the United States in Opposition app. at 1, Emerson v. United States, 536 U.S.
907 (2002) (No. 01-8780), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osglbriefs/2001/0responses/2001-
8780.resp.pdf [hereinafter Ashcroft Memorandum].
7. See Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in
an Organized Militia?, 83 TEx. L. REV. 237, 237 (2004) (book review) ("That the individual right
view prevailed definitively is evidenced by the fact that no Second Amendment scholar, no matter
how inimical to gun rights, makes the 'collective right' claim any more."); Glenn Harlan Reynolds,
Gun by Gun: After Almost 100 Years of Pretending the Right to Bear Arms Didn't Mean Much,
Judges and Scholars Are Changing Their Minds, LEGAL AFF., May/June 2002, at 19.
8. See Stuart Banner, The Second Amendment, So Far, 117 HARV. L. REV. 898, 907-08
(2004) (book review) ("A final area that could use more attention is the plumbing. What exactly will
the doctrine look like? What kinds of regulation will be unconstitutional? Which guns? Which peo-
ple? Which situations? This is lawyerly detail, well below the level of most of the debate thus far,
but it is detail that may be important one day.").
9. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution, Il1 HARV. L. REV.
54 (1997) (analyzing the tools courts use to translate rights into practical doctrine).
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sustained attention to what standard would be used under the individual-
rights reading.
The lack of attention to Second Amendment standards is possibly due to
the "assumption ... that an individual rights approach would mean strict
scrutiny ... when courts appraise the constitutionality of gun control meas-
ures."' ° In this Article, I challenge that assumption and consider the
arguments for a contrary conclusion, that the Second Amendment's individ-
ual right to bear arms is appropriately governed by a deferential,
reasonableness review under which nearly all gun control laws would sur-
vive judicial scrutiny.
The discussion here is informed by the example of state constitutional
law, where the individual right to bear arms is already well established.
Forty-two states have constitutional provisions guaranteeing an individual
right to bear arms" and, tellingly, the courts of every state to consider the
question apply a deferential "reasonable regulation" standard in arms rights
cases.12 No state's courts apply strict scrutiny or any other type of height-
10. Erwin Chemerinsky, Putting the Gun Control Debate in Social Perspective, 73 FORDHAM
L. REv. 477, 484 (2004).
11. Robert Dowlut, Federal and State Constitutional Guarantees to Arms, 15 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 59, 59 n.2 (1989). Since Dowlut wrote, Wisconsin has added an individual rights provision to
its constitution. WIs. CONST. art. 1, § 25. Currently, six states have no right-to-bear-arms provisions:
California, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, and New York. Dowlut, supra, at 59 n.2.
12. See, e.g., Hoskins v. State, 449 So. 2d 1269, 1270 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) ("[T]he consti-
tutional guarantee of the right of a citizen to bear arms is subject to reasonable regulation by the
state under its police power, and ... the classification created under the statute is warranted and is
clearly a reasonable exercise of the State's police power."); City of Tucson v. Rineer, 971 P.2d 207,
213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) ("[I]f it can be shown that an ordinance is directed at a legitimate legisla-
tive purpose and that the means by which the city seeks to achieve that purpose are reasonable, then
the ordinance is a proper exercise of the city's police power."); In re Wolstenholme, 1992 Del. Su-
per. LEXIS 341 at * 18 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 1992) ("Article I, § 7, of the Constitution of the
State of Delaware doles] not invalidate the Court's authority to impose reasonable restrictions on a
license to carry a concealed deadly weapon."); Carson v. State, 247 S.E.2d 68, 72 (Ga. 1978)
("[T]he question in each [right-to-bear-arms] case [is] 'whether the particular regulation involved is
legitimate and reasonably within the police power, or whether it is arbitrary, and, under the name of
regulation, amounts to a deprivation of the constitutional right."' (quoting Strickland v. State, 72
S.E. 260, 263 (Ga. 1911))); People v. Main, 795 N.E.2d 953, 958 (I11. App. Ct. 2003) ("[W]e ana-
lyze the constitutionality of the legislation at issue pursuant to the rational basis test. Under the
rational basis test, a statute is upheld where it 'bears a reasonable relationship to a public interest to
be served, and the means adopted are a reasonable method of accomplishing the desired objective."'
(quoting People v. Wright, 740 N.E.2d 755, 767 (I11. 2000))); Baker v. State, 747 N.E.2d 633, 638
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001) ("[The law] is subject to a rational basis review, and we will not invalidate it
unless it draws distinctions that simply make no sense."); Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 170,
181 (Ky. 2006) ("[Wle defer to the reasonable interpretation of our legislature, finding that the con-
stitution permits some reasonable regulation of the people's right to bear arms, but only to the extent
that such regulation is enacted to ensure the liberties of all persons by maintaining the proper and
responsible exercise of the general right... "); People v. Swint, 572 N.W.2d 666, 676 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1997) ("[The] right to bear arms.., is not absolute and is subject to... reasonable limitations
..... "); James v. State, 731 So. 2d 1135, 1137 (Miss. 1999) ("In limiting the possession of firearms
by those persons who have been shown to present a threat to public safety, peace and order, the state
is reasonably exercising its power to protect in the interest of the public."); State v. White, 253 S.W.
724, 727 (Mo. 1923) ("[The] right to bear arms may be taken away or limited by reasonable restric-
tions'"); State v. Comeau, 448 N.W.2d 595, 600 (Neb. 1989) ("We conclude that the statutes ... are
reasonable regulations of the right to keep and bear arms .... "); State v. Johnson, 610 S.E.2d 739,
746 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) ("[O1ur case law has 'consistently pointed out that the right of individuals
[Vol. 105:683
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ened review to gun laws. 3 Under the standard uniformly applied by the
states, any law that is a "reasonable regulation" of the arms right is constitu-
tionally permissible. Since World War II, state courts have authored
hundreds of opinions using this test to determine the constitutionality of all
sorts of gun control laws. All but a tiny fraction of these decisions uphold
the challenged gun control laws as reasonable measures to protect public
safety. If the federal courts follow suit and apply the reasonable regulation
standard, nearly all gun control laws will survive judicial review-despite
the construction of the Second Amendment to include an individual right.
As a result, any eventual triumph of the individual-rights reading of the Sec-
ond Amendment is likely to be more symbolic than substantive.
Part I of this Article examines how the standard of review question has
been addressed in the two most important legal developments supporting the
individual-rights construction of the Second Amendment: United States v.
Emerson, in which a federal circuit court formally read the amendment to
protect an individual right;4 and (former) Attorney General John Ashcroft's
Memorandum to United States Attorneys, which adopted the individual-
rights construction as the official position of the executive branch. 5 While
flirting with strict scrutiny, both balk at adopting a stringent standard that
might potentially interfere with ordinary gun regulation. This Part also sur-
veys the relatively thin scholarly literature on Second Amendment
to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to regulation.' The only requirement is that the regulation
must be reasonable and be related to the achievement of preserving public peace and safety." (quot-
ing State v. Dawson, 159 S.E.2d 1, 9 (N.C. 1968))); Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1044 (R.I.
2004) ("Numerous jurisdictions have recognized that the constitutional right to keep and bear arms
under a state constitution is not absolute and that reasonable regulatory control by the Legislature to
promote the safety and welfare of its citizens uniformly has been upheld."); Masters v. State, 653
S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) ("[Ais our State Constitution grants and guarantees a direct
right to the individual, our State Constitution limits that right by implicitly mandating the Legisla-
ture to enact reasonable regulations concerning the keeping and bearing of such arms in order that
the Legislature prevent disorder in our society."); State v. Duranleau, 260 A.2d 383, 386 (Vt. 1969)
(upholding a law when "the statutory purpose is reasonable"); Parham v. Commonwealth, 1996 Va.
App. LEXIS 758, at *5 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1996) ("The legislature must use means that are rea-
sonably related to the stated purpose."); Rohrbaugh v. State, 607 S.E.2d 404, 414 (W. Va. 2004)
("The restrictions contained therein are a proper exercise of the Legislature's police power to protect
the citizenry of this State and impose reasonable limitations on the right to keep and bear arms to
achieve this end."); State v. Hopkins, 2005 WL 2739081, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2005) (hold-
ing that the state constitution "also permits reasonable regulation of gun possession"); State v.
McAdams, 714 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Wyo. 1986) ("We are cognizant of the fact that our concealed
deadly weapons statute imposes some limitation on a person's right to bear arms in defense of him-
self; but, when balanced against the object of the statute, we do not find the limitation unreasonable
13. See Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1044 (R.I. 2004) ("Even in jurisdictions that have
declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny
analysis has been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test... ); State v. Cole, 665 N.W.2d 328,
337 (Wis. 2003) ("If this court were to utilize a strict scrutiny standard, Wisconsin would be the
only state to do so."); see also State v. Comeau, 448 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Neb. 1989) ("[Ciourts have
uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regula-
tory control over the state constitutional right to bear arms in order to promote the safety and
welfare of its citizens.").
14. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001).
15. Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 6.
Michigan Law Review
standards. Although some have suggested strict scrutiny, there has been no
thorough analysis of whether that standard is appropriate for the arms right.
Part II begins to fill this gap and considers the arguments in support of
Second Amendment strict scrutiny. Some commentators have assumed that
strict scrutiny would automatically apply because the right is textually
grounded in the Bill of Rights. Others have claimed that strict scrutiny
would necessarily apply if the right to bear arms is deemed a "fundamental"
right. Neither argument is persuasive. Most provisions in the Bill of Rights
do not trigger strict scrutiny, and the oft-repeated linkage between funda-
mental rights and strict scrutiny is more rhetoric than doctrinal reality.
Moreover, a Second Amendment right to bear arms would not fit with the
underlying theoretical arguments for heightened judicial review generally.
Motivated by public safety, gun control is not inherently invidious such that
a presumption of unconstitutionality is warranted.
Part III examines the reasons for deferential reasonableness review of
laws burdening the Second Amendment right to bear arms. The text, history,
and structure of the Second Amendment all support the application of a def-
erential form of scrutiny. The text of the amendment recognizes that some
regulation of firearms is "necessary," and the history of the right to bear
arms at both the federal and state levels makes clear that the Founding gen-
eration, and those subsequent, did not generally view gun control as
contrary to the existence of an arms right. Moreover, strong structural rea-
sons counsel in favor of relatively lenient judicial review: heightened
scrutiny would present significant problems of federalism, separation of
powers, and institutional competence for the courts.
Part IV examines the reasonable regulation standard used in state consti-
tutional law and considers what Second Amendment doctrine might look
like under that test. Over the past sixty years, the state courts have used the
reasonable regulation standard to uphold nearly all of the gun control laws
that have been challenged on right-to-bear-arms grounds. Although not quite
the same as the rational basis test widely used elsewhere in constitutional
law, the reasonable regulation standard is equally deferential, and courts
accept broad, overinclusive laws that would ordinarily be expected to fail
any form of heightened scrutiny. The standard does have its limits; laws that
are arbitrary or so restrictive as to "destroy" or "nullify" the right may be
deemed unreasonable. Few gun control laws, however, rise to this level.
Since World War I1, only six published opinions in the forty-two states
combined have invalidated gun control laws (or their application to particu-
lar individuals) under the state right-to-bear-arms guarantees.
Part V rounds out the discussion of Second Amendment standards of re-
view by considering what the right-to-bear-arms doctrine might look like if
the Supreme Court were to reject reasonableness review in favor of strict
scrutiny or some other form of heightened review. Famously "fatal in fact,"
strict scrutiny could conceivably call into question a range of gun control
measures. A more plausible scenario, however, is that Second Amendment
strict scrutiny--or intermediate scrutiny-would still end up being lenient in
[Vol. 105:683
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fact. Even under heightened scrutiny, most gun control laws could survive
Second Amendment challenge.
The Supreme Court may well adopt the individual-rights interpretation
of the Second Amendment in the near future. Yet we are just as likely to see
the Court applying the same deferential scrutiny that prevails at the state
level-regardless of whether the Court calls it reasonable regulation, inter-
mediate scrutiny, or even strict scrutiny. If that prediction is correct, then the
reinterpretation of the Second Amendment to protect an individual right to
bear arms will have only a marginal impact on the constitutionplity of gun
control.
I. WHOSE STANDARD Is THIS ANYWAY?
A. Implementing Rights
Even if the Supreme Court were to read the Second Amendment to pro-
tect an individual right to bear arms, important questions of implementation
would remain. The tests that govern judicial review are key factors deter-
mining the constitutional protection afforded by a right and the boundaries
of governmental power to legislate in that area. 6 Standards of review, such
as strict scrutiny and the rational basis test, are popular methods of imple-
menting constitutional norms, but they are not the only devices available.
Courts sometimes employ a definitional approach to implementation that
uses categorical rules to determine the scope of rights. For example, in free-
dom of speech-where standards are usually applied-the courts also use
some categorical rules, such as that which holds that obscenity is beyond the
scope of the First Amendment and thus unprotected.' 7 A law that regulates
obscenity as such is not subject to any typical balancing or weighing of the
interests; it is constitutional because the speech is outside of the purview of
the First Amendment.
Any eventual Second Amendment right-to-bear-arms doctrine may in-
clude some definitional or categorical rules. Even assuming an individual
right to bear arms, the Court could hold that some types of weapons are not
"arms" covered by the amendment. Nuclear bombs, hand grenades, and an-
thrax-laced letters are all weapons of a sort, but it is inconceivable that the
Court would hold that possession of such items is constitutionally guaran-
teed. Such weapons would be outside the scope of the Second Amendment,
and thus a potential possessor could not make a constitutional claim against
the government for denial of access to them.
While categorical rules may have a role to play in Second Amendment
jurisprudence, I wish to focus in this Article on standards of review. In state
constitutional law, an area in which the individual right to bear arms is al-
ready firmly established, the courts by and large use standards of review to
16. See Fallon, supra note 9, at 56-57.
17. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding obscene speech to be beyond
the scope of the First Amendment).
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adjudicate the validity of gun control--or, I should say, they use a standard
of review, the reasonable regulation test. Some state courts do occasionally
use categorical rules, holding for example that felons are not included
within the scope of the right." Yet even in these states, the usual practice is
for courts to apply the reasonable regulation standard to most weapons
laws.' 9 If the states are any indication, therefore, standards of review are
likely to be a key feature of right-to-bear-arms cases. 20 Moreover, the two
most significant legal statements of the individual-rights construction of the
Second Amendment-United States v. Emerson and the Ashcroft Memoran-
dum-both employed the language of standards, hinting at the potential role
that this type of implementing device may play. Although neither settled on
a clear standard of review to apply, together these two discussions recom-
mend close study of Second Amendment standards of review.
B. Standards in Second Amendment Law and Literature
In 2001, the Fifth Circuit issued a landmark decision that broke from at
least eighty years of federal court precedent and construed the Second
Amendment to protect an individual right to bear arms. United States v. Em-
erson contained forty-three pages of historical discussion to support the
individual-rights reading, 2' but then gave only passing attention to the sec-
2ond-order question of the applicable standard . Having found an individual
right to bear arms, the court, as Stuart Banner has observed, "seemed to be
,23at something of a loss as to exactly what to do next." The court upheld the
federal law challenged in that case, which banned individuals subject to a
24restraining order in domestic harassment cases from possessing firearms.
Here is Emerson's stumbling effort to articulate the appropriate standard:
Although, as we have held, the Second Amendment does protect individual
rights, that does not mean that those rights may never be made subject to
any limited, narrowly tailored specific exceptions or restrictions for par-
ticular cases that are reasonable and not inconsistent with the right of
Americans generally to individually keep and bear their private arms as
historically understood in this country.
25
18. E.g., State v. Hirsch, 34 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
19. See State v. Hirsch, 114 P.3d 1104, 1119 n.25 (Or. 2005).
20. Cf Banner, supra note 8, at 906 ("The Second [Amendment] would no doubt be inter-
preted analogously, with some kind of test like the ones used for the First and the Fourteenth, in
which courts assess the strength of the government's interest in regulating, the extent to which the
law at issue is tailored to that interest, and so on.").
21. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 218-60 (5th Cir. 2001).
22. Id. at 260-64.
23. Banner, supra note 8, at 908.
24. See Emerson, 270 F.3d at 264.
25. Id. at 261 (second and third emphasis added).
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For the student of constitutional law, this statement confuses more than
it clarifies.2 6 On the one hand, the court invokes the highest form of judicial
skepticism, the strict scrutiny standard, with its recognition of "narrowly
tailored" exceptions to the right to bear arms.2' The strict scrutiny test tradi-
tionally requires that laws infringing upon certain core rights be justified by
a "compelling" government interest that is furthered by "narrowly tailored"
means-i.e., means that are no more restrictive than necessary to achieve
the government interest.2 8 On the other hand, Emerson also invokes a much
lower level of judicial scrutiny when it refers to the Second Amendment
permitting "reasonable" restrictions on the arms right.29 Traditionally, rea-
sonableness review is a relatively deferential type of scrutiny under which
most laws are upheld.30
In the wake of Emerson, the Department of Justice, under then-Attorney
General John Ashcroft, voiced its support for the Fifth Circuit's holding that
the Second Amendment guaranteed an individual right,3' but only added to
the confusion over the appropriate standard of review. In a memorandum to
all United States Attorneys and a letter to the National Rifle Association,
Ashcroft officially adopted the individual-rights reading as the position of
Justice but invoked the inconsistent elements of both strict scrutiny and
more deferential review: "Of course, the individual rights view of the Sec-
ond Amendment does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws restricting
firearms ownership for compelling state interests, such as prohibiting fire-
arms ownership by convicted felons ... *,32 Here we see the famous first
prong of strict scrutiny review. In the Ashcroft Memorandum, however, the
Attorney General goes on to state, "the existence of this individual right
does not mean that reasonable restrictions cannot be imposed to prevent
unfit persons from possessing firearms or to restrict possession of firearms
particularly suited to criminal misuse.' 33 The Ashcroft Memorandum and
letter thus repeat the confusion of Emerson, referring simultaneously to both
heightened and deferential scrutiny.
An interesting caveat in the Ashcroft Memorandum suggests the Justice
Department may be leaning toward a relatively low level of judicial scrutiny.
After setting forth the administration's support for the individual-rights
reading, the Ashcroft Memorandum stated that "[t]he Department [of Justice]
26. See Katherine Hunt Federle, The Second Amendment Rights of Children, 89 IOWA L.
REV. 609, 650 (2004) ("[T]he court fails to articulate the appropriate level of scrutiny for judicial
review of the legislation.").
27. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 261.
28. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 416 (1997).
29. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 261.
30. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at 415.
31. Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 6.
32. Letter from John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen. of the U.S., to James Jay Baker, Executive
Dir., Nat'l Rifle Ass'n 2 n. I (May 17, 2001), available at http://www.nraila.org/images/Ashcroft.pdf
(emphasis added).
33. Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 6 (emphasis added).
February 20071
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can and will continue to defend vigorously the constitutionality, under the
Second Amendment, of all existing federal firearms laws." 34 In other words,
in the Department's view, every single federal law burdening the right to
bear arms remains constitutional despite what one might have thought to be
a rather radical revision of the Second Amendment's meaning. The more
things change, the more they stay the same.
Like Emerson and the Ashcroft Memorandum, the abundant scholarly
literature on the Second Amendment has largely focused on the core mean-
ing of the amendment and given much less attention to the standard of
review question. As Erwin Chemerinsky observes, the literature commonly
assumes that an individual-rights reading of the Second Amendment would
occasion judicial adoption of strict scrutiny.35 Roy Lucas contends that
"strict scrutiny" should apply in order to "avoid leaps of illogic and unjust
treatment of defendants for acts and omissions that are miles distant from
criminal activity.' 36 Brannon Denning and Glenn Reynolds suggest that rec-
ognizing an individual right to bear arms in the Second Amendment, as they
believe is necessary, would probably mean that "government regulation of
[firearms] must survive strict scrutiny.' 37 Randy Barnett and Don Kates each
write that the arms right is subject to "reasonable regulation," but then seem
to imply that they mean some form of heightened review by equating Sec-
ond Amendment scrutiny with what is applied to speech restrictions under
the First Amendment.3 s Calvin Massey has written the most sustained dis-
cussion to date of potential Second Amendment standards, and he argues for
what he calls "semi-strict scrutiny."'3 9
Not everyone supports strict scrutiny or some other form of heightened
review. Chemerinsky questions the assumption of strict scrutiny and notes
that some other test, such as rational basis review, could conceivably apply. 
°
A few other scholars, including Laurence Tribe and Akhil Amar, also sug-
gest in passing that reasonable regulations on the right should survive
scrutiny.4' But these scholars have not sought to analyze thoroughly the
standards of review question; their points about standards were only sugges-
tive.
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. See Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 484.
36. Roy Lucas, From Patsone & Miller to Silveira v. Lockyer: To Keep and Bear Arms, 26 T.
JEFFERSON L. REv. 257, 329 (2004).
37. Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Telling Miller's Tale: A Reply to David
Yassky, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2002, at 120.
38. See Barnett, supra note 7, at 271-72; Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dia-
logue, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1986, at 145-46.
39. See Calvin Massey, Guns, Extremists, and the Constitution, 57 WAsH. & LEE L. REv.
1095, 1133 (2000).
40. Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 484.
41. See Laurence H. Tribe & Akhil Reed Amar, Op-Ed., Well-Regulated Militias, and More,
N.Y TIMES, Oct. 28, 1999, at A31 ("The right to bear arms is certainly subject to reasonable regula-
tion in the interest of public safety.").
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The discussion below aims to fill the gap in the literature and to offer a
more complete analysis of the appropriateness of strict scrutiny. In addition,
this Article offers a more detailed discussion of the state constitutional law
alternative-the reasonable regulation test-and considers what that might
mean for the Second Amendment.
II. SCRUTINIZING THE ARGUMENTS FOR SECOND
AMENDMENT STRICT SCRUTINY
What arguments could be made that strict scrutiny should apply to laws
burdening the Second Amendment right to bear arms? This Part examines
the arguments for Second Amendment strict scrutiny and concludes that
they are not persuasive.
A. The Bill of Rights Argument
One argument in favor of strict scrutiny is that, as a textual provision in
the original Bill of Rights, the individual right to bear arms necessarily war-
rants heightened review. Federal Circuit Judge Harold DeMoss, who was
part of the Emerson majority, expressed this view in a recent dissenting
opinion:
If some other statute of Congress purported to take away or restrict (1) "the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government
for redress of grievances" under the First Amendment, or (2) "the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures" under the Fourth Amendment, or (3)
the right of any person to be free from being "compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself' under the Fifth Amendment, or (4)
the right of any person "to have the assistance of counsel for his defense"
in any criminal case under the Sixth Amendment because, in each event,
such person was "an unlawful user of or addicted to a controlled sub-
stance," then surely this court would use the test of strict scrutiny to
determine the validity of that statutory restriction.42
The first (and most startling) thing to notice about Judge DeMoss's ar-
gument is that three of the four provisions of the Bill of Rights he cites are
not governed by the strict scrutiny standard at all. Although the freedom of
association implicit in the right of assembly does occasionally trigger strict
scrutiny protection,43 the courts do not use strict scrutiny in Fourth
Amendment search and seizure cases,4 Fifth Amendment right against
42. United States v. Herrera, 313 F.3d 882, 889 (5th Cir. 2002) (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
43. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623-24 (1984) (applying strict scrutiny to a free-
dom of association claim).
44. See, e.g., Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53, 663 (1995) (employ-
ing a reasonableness test and asserting that the Court has repeatedly declined to apply strict scrutiny




self-incrimination cases, or Sixth Amendment right to counsel cases. In
none of these doctrines do the courts employ a compelling interest analysis
or anything resembling heightened review. Nevertheless, Judge DeMoss's
argument reflects a common belief that strict scrutiny necessarily applies to
the right to bear arms because the Second Amendment is located in the Bill
of Rights.47
This Second Amendment syllogism fails in its minor premise: the notion
that all textually based rights in the Bill trigger strict scrutiny. This is simply
incorrect as a matter of constitutional doctrine. Many, indeed most, of the
Bill of Rights guarantees do not trigger strict scrutiny. Only a small number
of those provisions are governed by the strict scrutiny standard: free speech,
free exercise of religion, and freedom of association under the First Amend-
ment, and substantive due process and the implicit equal protection
guarantee of the Fifth Amendment. In other words, strict scrutiny is applied
in cases arising from only two textual provisions of the Bill of Rights, the
First and Fifth Amendments. (Strict scrutiny is also applied in cases arising
from the Fourteenth Amendment, outside of the Bill.) Strict scrutiny is not
applied in any doctrines arising out of the Third Amendment, the Fourth
Amendment, the Sixth Amendment, the Seventh Amendment, the Eighth
Amendment, the Ninth Amendment or the Tenth Amendment. From this, we
might conclude that textual grounding in the Bill of Rights creates a pre-
sumption against strict scrutiny.
Nevertheless, the reason for Judge DeMoss's confusion is not hard to
fathom. Constitutional lawyers have long been baptized by footnote four of
United States v. Carolene Products, in which Justice Harlan Fiske Stone
wrote that "[t]here may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption
of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a spe-
cific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments. ' 48 Law students are taught that, under footnote four, height-
ened review applies to the individual rights provisions of the Bill of Rights.
But courts do not and have never applied strict scrutiny consistently to all of
these provisions. Footnote four was a proposal that, despite wide influence
in constitutional theory, has never been accepted in practice by the Supreme
Court. The Court has allowed most of the Bill's provisions to be imple-
45. See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 189-90 (2004) (using cate-
gorical rules that require the privilege against self-incrimination to be respected whenever the
testimony has a "reasonable danger of incrimination").
46. See, e.g., Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) (applying a categorical rule that any
interrogation outside of the presence of counsel, after the defendant has asserted the right, is inva-
lid).
47. See, e.g., Donald Dowd, The Relevance of the Second Amendment to Gun Control Legis-
lation, 58 Motor. L. REV. 79, 111 (1997) (acknowledging this argument); Barnett, supra note 7, at
271-72; see also Roger I. Roots, The Approaching Death of the Collective Right Theory of the Sec-
ond Amendment, 39 DuQ. L. REV. 71, 81 n.51 (2000) ("[A] rational basis type of review seems
antithetical to any right protected under the Bill of Rights.").
48. 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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mented by devices other than strict scrutiny and its presumption of unconsti-
tutionality.
49
Moreover, even the individual rights in the Bill that do trigger strict
scrutiny only receive the protection of such review some of the time. The
freedom of speech, for example, is not governed exclusively by strict scru-
tiny; in many cases, if not most, courts apply more deferential forms of• 50
review. Content-neutral regulations impinging on freedom of speech are
not governed by strict scrutiny, but by United States v. O'Brien's relatively
deferential standard, which results in challenged legislation being upheld
regularly.5 Not even all content-based speech restrictions are subject to
strict scrutiny. When the content is commercial speech, the courts apply the
more deferential standard from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission.2 When the government regulates the content of
speech, but is acting as an employer (rather than sovereign), the courts apply
the relatively deferential standard from Pickering v. Board of Education.3
Strict scrutiny only applies to a subset of speech restrictions.
The Supreme Court also applies strict scrutiny sparingly in free exercise
of religion cases. The Warren Court began applying strict scrutiny in free
exercise cases in 1963, with the decision in Sherbert v. Verner.4 Overturn-
ing Sherbert, the Rehnquist Court in Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith held that strict scrutiny was inappropriate for
generally applicable laws that burdened religious practices. Such claims
for exemptions make up the vast majority of free exercise claims,56 yet the
Constitution requires only rational basis review under Smith. Ironically, the
courts in some exemption cases still apply strict scrutiny under two federal
statutes, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act5 7 and the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.58 The irony is not that the standard
survives, but that, even though it survives, few laws fail to satisfy its
49. Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, CONST. COMMENT.
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=902673.
50. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://papers.ssm.comabstract=887566 (detailing the pervasiveness of intermediate scrutiny in
freedom of speech cases).
51. Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1175,
2000-04 (1996) (recognizing the substantial leeway created by the intermediate scrutiny used for
content-neutral laws).
52. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
53. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
54. 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
55. 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990).
56. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 861 (2006) (finding that, between 1990 and
2003, the federal courts ruled on fifty-eight claims for exemptions compared to fifteen claims of
intentional religious discrimination).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2000).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a) (2000).
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requirements. In a recent study, I found that the federal courts applying strict
scrutiny upheld generally applicable laws against claims for religion-based
exemptions in seventy-four percent of cases.5 9 Even where strict scrutiny
applies, it can be deferential in practice.
The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and implicit equal protec-
tion guarantee trigger strict scrutiny, but none of the several other individual
rights guaranteed by that amendment receive the same protection. The right
to property protected by the Takings Clause, for example, is governed by a
diverse set of tests that include categorical rules (e.g., all permanent physical
takings must be compensated), 60 deferential scrutiny (the Penn Central test
for regulatory takings),6' and a form of intermediate scrutiny (for excessive
62exactions cases). One does not find strict scrutiny in the doctrines arising
from the Fifth Amendment's rights against self-incrimination, to indictment
by grand jury, or against double jeopardy. Despite footnote four, strict scru-
tiny is quite rarely applied to laws burdening the textually guaranteed rights
found in the Bill of Rights.
Reasonableness review is used in one of the most important provisions
of the Bill of Rights: the Fourth Amendment.6' This provision, which is so
central to the protection of privacy rights, does not require that invasive laws
be strictly scrutinized but only that invasions be reasonable. Under Fourth
Amendment reasonableness review, the Court balances the "intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against [the] promotion of legiti-
mate governmental interests." 64 The Court has recently been explicit that this
standard does not require the most important element of heightened review:
the precise fit required by the narrow tailoring, or least restrictive means,
65analysis.
Assuming that standards of review will have some role in shaping Sec-
ond Amendment doctrine, one thing is clear: strict scrutiny is not
automatically the applicable standard simply because the right is textually
grounded in the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court uses rational basis scru-
tiny, intermediate scrutiny, reasonableness review, and other tests far less
demanding than strict scrutiny for individual rights found in the hallowed
Bill.
B. The Fundamental Rights Argument
A corollary argument to the Bill-of-Rights argument is that strict scru-
tiny would apply because the right to bear arms is-or would be under an
59. Winkler, supra note 56, at 861.
60. Lorretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
61. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
62. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
63. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995).
64. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
65. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 663.
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individual-rights reading-a "fundamental" right.66 Under current Second
Amendment doctrine, the right protected by the Second Amendment is not
deemed "fundamental. 67 Yet one would imagine that holding would be re-
considered should the Supreme Court reinterpret the amendment to protect
an individual right. Leaving to the side the question of whether the right to
bear arms should be deemed a "fundamental" right, I wish to focus here on
the standard of review side of the equation. Even assuming the right were, in
some sense, fundamental, does strict scrutiny necessarily apply? While it is
often said that fundamental rights trigger strict scrutiny, the answer is not so
simple. As with the Bill-of-Rights argument, constitutional doctrine does
not live up to the frequent refrain. It simply is not true that every fight
deemed "fundamental" triggers strict scrutiny.
6
8
The Supreme Court has never identified precisely what determines
whether a right is "fundamental" or not. There are three potential ways to
define "fundamental rights." The first definition relies on textual placement:
all rights in the Bill of the Rights might be deemed fundamental. Yet, as
already noted, not all of the rights found in the Bill of Rights are protected
by strict scrutiny. A second definition of fundamental rights takes its cue
from the incorporation doctrine, under which only those provisions of the
69Bill of Rights deemed "fundamental" apply to the states. Under this defini-
tion, most but not all of the rights in the Bill are fundamental; only the
Second Amendment, the Third Amendment, the Fifth Amendment's Grand
Jury Clause, the Seventh Amendment's right to trial by jury in civil cases,
and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on excessive fines have not been
incorporated.0 Assuming the Second Amendment right to bear arms would
also be incorporated to apply against the states, the right would be in this
sense fundamental. Nevertheless, as we have already seen, many of the indi-
vidual rights in the Bill of Rights do not trigger strict scrutiny, including
many that are incorporated (such as the Takings Clause, Fourth Amendment
rights, and Sixth Amendment rights). Even among those incorporated rights
66. For examples of statements to the effect that the right to bear arms would require strict
scrutiny because the right is a fundamental one, see Lucas, supra note 36, at 328-29 (noting without
argument that strict scrutiny would apply to the Second Amendment fight due to its fundamental
nature), and Janice Baker, Comment, The Next Step in Second Amendment Analysis: Incorporating
the Right to Bear Arms into the Fourteenth Amendment, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 35, 55 (2002) (ob-
serving without extended discussion that strict scrutiny "logically follows ... if the Supreme Court
considers a right fundamental to the American scheme of justice"). See also Arnold v. City of Cleve-
land, 616 N.E.2d 163, 176 (Ohio 1993) (Hoffman, J., dissenting) (arguing for strict scrutiny because
the arms right is "fundamental" under the Ohio constitution).
67. United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 128 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[T]he right to possess a gun is
clearly not a fundamental right... "); see Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (suggest-
ing the right to bear arms is not as fundamental as other rights).
68. Mathew S. Nosanchuk, The Embarrassing Interpretation of the Second Amendment, 29
N. Ky. L. REv. 705, 784 (2002) ("Even what the Supreme Court describes as a fundamental right
does not always merit strict scrutiny.'). Nosanchuk aptly recognizes that courts apply lower level
scrutiny in the doctrines of a number of constitutional rights, including free speech and equal protec-
tion. Id. at 785-86.
69. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at 379.
70. Id. at 382-84.
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that do prompt strict scrutiny, such as the freedom of speech and of religion,
strict scrutiny is only occasionally applied.
A third definition of fundamental rights limits them to a narrower class
of so-called preferred rights that are "clothed with special judicial protec-
tion"' These rights include freedom of speech, freedom of religion, the
right to vote, the right to marry, and the right to privacy.72 Although the
Court has never made clear precisely why some individual rights are pre-
ferred over others, traditional theories emphasize that these core rights areS • 73
essential to freedom and human dignity. I will leave it to others to argue
whether the right to bear arms serves these functions. In any case, assuming
the right is deemed fundamental because it is a preferred right, strict scru-
tiny remains far from certain. Even among preferred rights, strict scrutiny is
not always applied.
Strict scrutiny, for example, does not apply to fundamental, preferred
rights when the courts determine that the underlying burden is only inciden-
tal. Constitutional scholars, including Michael Dorf and Alan Brownstein,
have shown the pervasiveness of courts' upholding laws deemed to be inci-
dental burdens on fundamental rights.74 Such laws are "real infringements of
rights," according to Dorf, yet the Supreme Court nevertheless tends to ap-
ply lower-level scrutiny (or none at all) absent a "substantial" burden on the
75 76rights. This approach is common in speech, religion, and privacy cases.
Let us take the right of privacy as an illustration. In Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court affirmed the "central hold-
ing" of Roe v. Wade77 that a woman has a privacy right to choose abortion,78
but the joint opinion (and later a majority of the Court) 79 abandoned Roe's
strict scrutiny framework in favor of a more lenient "undue burden" test.8° A
woman's right to choose was not deemed to be any less fundamental; ac-
cording to the joint opinion in Casey, "[tlhese matters, involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices cen-
tral to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment."'" Yet this right, so vitally important to human
71. See Henry J. Abraham, Fundamental Rights, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 1176, 1177 (Leonard W. Levy et al., eds., 2d. ed. 2000).
72. See id.; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 770 (2d ed. 1988) (iden-
tifying "preferred rights").
73. See, e.g., id., at 770 (arguing that the underlying interests "touch[] more deeply and
permanently on human personality [and] came to be regarded as the constituents of freedom .... ").
74. See Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in
Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 893-94 (1994); Dorf, supra note 51, at 1180.
75. Dorf, supra note 51, at 1179-80.
76. See id. at 1199-200.
77. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
78. 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992) (joint opinion).
79. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000).
80. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876.
81. Id. at 851.
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dignity, did not trigger strict scrutiny, at least so long as the basic ability to
choose abortion early in pregnancy was preserved. With regard to mere bur-
dens on the right, the level of judicial protection was markedly less than
strict scrutiny; so long as a law does not pose an undue burden on the right
prior to viability, it will survive.82 While the nuances of the undue burden
test remain to be seen, its leniency relative to strict scrutiny is readily appar-
ent. The three abortion regulations upheld in Casey-parental notification,83
informed consent,8 and a twenty-four-hour waiting period"-would have
86
been invalidated under Roe's strict scrutiny framework . Commentators
have argued that the undue burden standard is essentially a form of scrutiny
akin to intermediate or rational basis review.87
The Supreme Court has used something less than strict scrutiny for even
substantial burdens on fundamental rights, at least in the context of the right
of privacy. In Lawrence v. Texas, for example, the Court invalidated Texas's
criminal ban on private intimate sexual relations among persons of the same
sex. While Lawrence never quite said the underlying right was fundamen-
tal-and the opinion was hardly a model of clarity, making strong
inferences difficult to draw-the Court was straightforward in tying the un-
derlying right to a line of cases stretching from Griswold v. Connecticut 9 to
Roe v. Wade9° that did unambiguously recognize sexual privacy rights as
fundamental. 9' Moreover, the Court held that the "right to liberty under the
Due Process Clause gives [same-sex partners] the full right to engage in
their conduct without intervention of the government,' 92 and such substan-
tive due process rights are usually thought of as fundamental. Nevertheless,
the Court avoided the language of strict scrutiny and invoked instead what
82. Id. at 876.
83. Id. at 899-900.
84. Id. at 881-85.
85. Id. at 886-87.
86. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (invalidating a parental notifica-
tion requirement under Roe); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983)
(invalidating a waiting period under Roe).
87. See, e.g., Deborah A. Ellis, Protecting "Pregnant Persons": Women's Equality and Re-
productive Freedom, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 967, 975-76 (1996); Gillian E. Metzger,
Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2025, 2033 (1994). One reasonable reading of Casey is that the joint opinion's
undue burden test is not a standard of review at all but a categorical rule: if the law poses an undue
burden, it is invalid, and if the law does not pose an undue burden, it survives. See Planned Parent-
hood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). While I recognize this potential reading, the point
remains that even the fundamental right to privacy is subject to something other than strict scrutiny
review.
88. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
89. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
90. 410 U.S. 113(1973).
91. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-66.
92. Id. at 578.
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appeared to be the rational basis test,93 demanding that the law be justified
merely by a "legitimate state interest." 94 With nothing more than moral dis-
approval to justify the law, the Court ruled that even this low hurdle was not
met. The only federal circuit court decision to date to consider the issue held
that Lawrence applied rational basis review, not strict scrutiny.95
If it was ever true that all fundamental rights elicited strict scrutiny, the
Rehnquist Court in cases like Lawrence and Casey charted a different
course. Even preferred rights sometimes receive little more than rational
basis review. Whether the right to bear arms is fundamental in any of the
three potential definitions, strict scrutiny may or may not apply. The mere
fact of "fundamentality" does not answer the question of what would be the
appropriate standard of review for the right to bear arms.
C. Theories of Strict Scrutiny
Rebutting the arguments that all provisions that are in the Bill of Rights
or that are deemed to protect a "fundamental" right trigger strict scrutiny
reveals only that strict scrutiny is not automatic. It does not indicate affirma-
tively whether strict scrutiny is appropriate. Perhaps the best way to answer
this latter question is to consider the individual right to bear arms in light of
the traditional justifications for strict scrutiny. Does the right to bear arms fit
comfortably with the underlying theoretical reasons why courts apply
heightened review to certain constitutional rights? Does legislation burden-
ing the right to bear arms pose the sort of dangers that strict scrutiny is
designed to protect against?
. There are two main theories of strict scrutiny: an invidious motive the-
ory and a cost-benefit theory.96 Neither gives strong support for theapplication of strict scrutiny to laws burdening the right to bear arms.
1. Invidious Motive Theory of Strict Scrutiny
The invidious motive theory has its roots in the development of equal
protection law by the Vinson and Warren Courts to confront the problem of
race discrimination. In a series of decisions, the Court explained that height-
ened review was necessary for certain constitutional rights when any
legislative encroachment ought to be thought of as "immediately suspect."97
93. Id. at 586, 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 578 (majority opinion).
95. Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't. of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (1 lth Cir.
2004). This circuit court decision is not without controversy. See Mark Strasser, Rebellion in the
Eleventh Circuit: On Lawrence, Lofton, and the Best Interests of Children, 40 TULSA L. REV. 421
(2005).
96. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scru-
tiny 7 & n.31 (Jan. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
97. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Elena Kagan has argued that First
Amendment strict scrutiny also reflects a hunt for illicit motivation. Elena Kagan, Private Speech,
Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L.
REv. 413,453-54 (1996).
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What made a law suspect was the likelihood that the motives underlying the
legislation were "invidious 9 8 or improper. As the Rehnquist Court recently
explained in the context of race discrimination: "[t]he reasons for strict scru-
tiny are familiar. Racial classifications raise special fears that they are
motivated by an invidious purpose."99 Strict scrutiny is thus a tool "to
'smoke out' " illegitimate motives where there is special reason to believe
such motives led to the challenged law.l°
The motive behind most gun control law is to enhance public safety,
which is hardly an invidious motive. In fact, it is a perfectly legitimate goal
for government. Not only is government permitted to impose restrictions on
firearms to reduce violence and injury, government has a "duty" to do so.101
Guns are undeniably dangerous and some measure of regulation is neces-
sary in light of the overwhelming state interest in preserving the safety and
security of the public from deadly weapons.' 2 Individual-rights scholars
agree.0 3 According to Randy Barnett, "virtually all individual-rights schol-
ars ... hold the position that an individual right may be subject to
regulation."' 4 According to Donald Dowd, "[a] legislature cannot be pre-
sumed to have acted unconstitutionally when it passes gun control measures
for the purpose of preventing the harm that can be caused by guns"' 05 The
underlying end of gun control, as a general matter, is not illegitimate and
thus such laws are not properly considered "immediately suspect'"
To be sure, there have been and will be occasional gun control laws en-
acted with illegitimate motivation. In the right-to-bear-arms context, a
constitutionally "illegitimate" motive might be to disarm the people com-
pletely. No doubt some gun enthusiasts fear that that proponents of gun
control truly desire to make the United States more like Great Britain, where
individual gun possession is traditionally illegal. Assuming an individual
right, no legislature can appropriately set out to completely deny the people
access to all guns. Even shielded by the justification of public safety, disar-
mament would eliminate a constitutional right and absent constitutional
amendment would be per se illegitimate.
Even though some gun control measures may be motivated by constitu-
tionally illegitimate objectives, this alone is not sufficient to warrant strict
scrutiny's presumption of unconstitutionality. There must also be a high
98. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
99. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005).
100. Id. at 506 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality
opinion)).
101. People v. Blue, 544 P.2d 385, 390-91 (Colo. 1975).
102. See State v. Cole, 665 N.W.2d 328, 337 (Wis. 2003).
103. See, e.g., Don B. Kates Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Sec-
ond Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 260-62 (1983) (identifying permissible restrictions on the
individual right to bear arms); Lund, supra note 1, at 122-23 (same); Reynolds, supra note 1, at
478-79 (same).
104. Barnett, supra note 7, at 270.
105. Dowd, supra note 47, at 109.
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likelihood that all legislation in the area is motivated by improper motives.
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,1"6 which held that strict
scrutiny was not applicable to disability classifications, the Court explained
that where some legislation in an area is "plainly... legitimate," the "predi-
cate" for "[h]eightened scrutiny" is not present.'°7 In the disability context,
the Court found that rational basis review was applicable because "in the
vast majority of situations" legislation is not invidious but "desirable."'08
Moreover, legislation in the area was "a difficult and often a technical mat-
ter."' 9 As a result, "a certain amount of flexibility and freedom from judicial
oversight""0 was required. The same can be said for the right to bear arms:
some regulation is necessary, and achieving public safety is a difficult and
technical task worthy of some legislative leeway.
Recognition of the legitimacy of gun control as a general matter does
not mean that courts should have no continuing oversight role to play in
right-to-bear-arms cases. The Cleburne Court was not ignorant of the poten-
tial for an improperly motivated disability classification; the particular law
at issue in the case was invalidated for being a reflection of "mere negative
attitudes.""' The point of Cleburne is that when the majority of laws can be
expected to be motivated by legitimate governmental concerns lower-level
scrutiny suffices to smoke out the occasional instance of illegitimate motive.
Strict scrutiny is appropriately reserved for areas of law, such as race dis-
crimination and restrictions on political speech, where we would expect
most, if not all, regulation to be invidious.
Even well-meaning legislation can be constitutionally invidious if the
underlying political process is operating with systemic defects-say by ex-
cluding some from participating in lawmaking." 2 Restrictions on the free
flow of democratic self-government represent another form of improper
purpose that occasion strict scrutiny's presumption of unconstitutionality.
But even with gun control widespread, gun owners are hardly a Second
Amendment version of a suspect class. Gun enthusiasts are a powerful po-
litical force, represented ably at both the federal and state level by the
National Rifle Association and other groups. Proponents of gun rights have
succeeded in amending twelve state constitutions since 1978 to add protec-
tions for the individual right to bear arms."3 One sign of the pro-gun
106. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
107. Id. at 442-43.
108. Id. at 444.
109. Id. at 443.
110. Id. at 445.
Ill. Id. at 448.
112. Cf United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting
heightened review when the political process is defective). I thank Robert Goldstein for persuading
me to give due attention to the process-based justification for strict scrutiny.
113. Robert A. Creamer, Note, History Is Not Enough: Using Contemporary Justifications for
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Interpreting the Second Amendment, 45 B.C. L. REv. 905, 919
(2004).
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movement's political power is the remarkably rapid adoption of concealed
carry laws in recent years. Since 1990, twenty-nine states have passed legis-
lation permitting the concealed carrying of firearms and a total of thirty-nine
states now have such laws.' 4 In Second Amendment cases, the political
process concerns that often motivate heightened review are not present."5
The invidiousness of restrictions on the free flow of democratic proc-
esses might have salience to the Second Amendment if that provision were
read to secure the people's right to revolt against tyrannical government.
Legislators might limit access to weapons to eliminate the possibility of
successful revolution. Yet contemporary Second Amendment scholarship
disfavors the revolution-preserving basis of the arms right, emphasizing in-
stead individual security or self-protection.'6 Under such a reading, the right
is fundamentally about securing individuals' ability to defend themselves,
their homes, and their families from violent attack. The reason for the rejec-
tion of a right of revolution is plain: armed revolt against today's military
would require the possession of powerful weapons such as bombs, shoulder-
launched missiles, and howitzers. Civilized society simply cannot tolerate
individual possession of such weapons, and not even the most vigorous pro-
ponent of an individual right to bear arms would argue otherwise. As a result
of the rejection of the right of revolution, the process-based concern for
governmental entrenchment loses much of its force.
Thus, even strong proponents of an individual right to bear arms concur
that some legislative regulation is legitimate, and there are no countervailing
reasons to believe that all or even most gun laws should be viewed as inher-
ently suspect. There is clearly a place for regulation of the right to bear
arms, making strict scrutiny's presumption of unconstitutionality inappro-
priate for gun control under the invidious motive theory.
2. Cost-Benefit Theory of Strict Scrutiny
The second theory of strict scrutiny justifies heightened review as a ju-
dicial mechanism to enforce the "overarching commitment" to protect
certain rights from all but the most rare and extraordinary government regu-
lation." 7 According to Stephen Siegel's excellent history of strict scrutiny,
the standard arose as a "tool to determine whether there is a cost-benefit
justification for governmental action that burdens interests for which the
Constitution demands unusually high protection.'' " Rights are not absolute
114. Mark Fritz, Selling Guns to the Gun-Shy, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2005, at B 1.
115. Cf City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 443-44 (1985) (arguing
that the political success of the disabled "belies a continuing apathy or prejudice and a correspond-
ing need for more intrusive oversight by the judiciary").
116. E.g., Massey, supra note 39, at 1123 ("Almost nobody believes that the citizenry is con-
stitutionally entitled to resist governmental tyranny by force of arms. The insurrectionist view of the
arms right receives little support and we may safely discount it." (emphasis omitted)).
117. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 741 (1996)
(describing this tradition after a long list of citations to landmark speech cases).
118. Siegel, supra note 96, at 84.
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bars on legislation, but rights can only be regulated in the most compelling
and exigent circumstances. "9 Strict scrutiny, according to Ashutosh Bhag-
wat, serves as "a safety valve in the event of a 'hard case,' where the
governmental and societal reasons for infringing upon an individual right
are particularly strong."'
'20
The cost-benefit, or hard case, approach to heightened review originated
in the Supreme Court's free speech decisions of the mid-twentieth century."'
Free speech required unusually great protection from legislative infringe-
ment because of "its central function in the preservation of the democratic
process."'' 22 The speech right is preferred because, unlike many other rights,
it is essential to the smooth functioning of our representative system. When
government limits speech, self-government suffers because only govern-
ment-approved ideas are allowed.
One may reasonably question how central the individual right to bear
arms is to the democratic process. The federal government has operated at
least since the 1930s without a recognized individual right, and self-
governance has not withered. In fact, we might imagine that allowing only
government-approved guns helps, rather than inhibits, democracy. Whereas
robust protection of free speech makes democratic dialogue uninhibited and
thus serves democracy, if everyone had access to howitzers and machine
guns, representative democracy would likely be harder, not easier, to
achieve. As African Americans learned too well during Reconstruction, the
threat of violence is an extremely effective means of keeping people from
democratic participation.123
Moreover, the recognized need for some degree of regulation of firearms
suggests that gun control is ordinary rather than exigent. If courts allow only
the rare gun control measure to survive-the so-called "hard case"-then
the legislative duty to protect the public safety will be profoundly frustrated.
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,'24 Jus-
tice Scalia's majority opinion argued that strict scrutiny was not appropriate
in most free exercise cases because many burdensome laws were neverthe-
less necessary for the public welfare. "[I]f 'compelling interest' really means
what it says . . . many laws will not meet the test"-a result he warned
would be "courting anarchy." 25 Such a concern for anarchy has even more
force in the context of the right to bear arms, where obvious public dangers
119. See id. at 23.
120. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30
CONN. L. REV. 961,970 (1998).
121. See Siegel, supra note 96, at 16-27.
122. Id. at 22-23.
123. Cf ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877,
at 425-28 (1988) (describing how the Ku Klux Klan used violence to intimidate African Americans
from political participation).
124. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
125. Id. at 888.
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would stem from a vigorous judicial oversight that undermined the legisla-
tures' ability to regulate weapons.
D. Strict Scrutiny in the States
In light of the poor fit of the right to bear arms with the traditional theo-
ries of strict scrutiny, perhaps it should come as little surprise that courts in
states with constitutional right-to-bear-arms guarantees decline to apply that
standard to gun control. The question has arisen in numerous cases, but the




An illustration is State v. Cole, a 2003 decision of the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court."' The Wisconsin Constitution was amended in 1999 to include
a new provision guaranteeing an individual right to bear arms, and the court
was asked to apply strict scrutiny to the state's concealed carry permitting
law. Explaining that "relatively deferential" review was "appropriate be-
cause the interests of public safety involved here are compelling,"'2 9 the
court held that arms regulation should not receive strict scrutiny's presump-
tion of unconstitutionality. Cole continued:
We find that the state constitutional right to bear arms is fundamental.
It is indeed a rare occurrence for the state constitution's Declaration of
Rights to be amended. Article I, Section 25 explicitly grants a right to bear
arms. Further, there is evidence in the legislative history of the amendment
that it was intended to grant a "fundamental individual" right.
Nevertheless, we do not agree with Cole's position that strict scrutiny
or intermediate scrutiny is required in this case."3
Note that strict scrutiny does not apply despite the court's recognition of
the right to bear arms as fundamental. Cole and the decisions of other state
courts uniformly hold that, even if the right to bear arms is a fundamental
right, deferential review is appropriate for arms regulation."' If there was
any doubt about the possibility of something much less demanding than
strict scrutiny applying to a right considered "fundamental," one need look
only at the state courts in right-to-bear-arms cases to see it in practice.
126. Jeffrey Monks, Comment, The End of Gun Control or Protection Against Tyranny?: The
Impact of the New Wisconsin Constitutional Right to Bear Arms on State Gun Control Laws, 2001
Wis. L. REV. 249, 290 (emphasis added).
127. 665 N.W.2d 328, 337 (Wis. 2003).
128. Id. at 329.
129. Id. at 337; see also State v. Mendoza, 920 P.2d 357, 367-68 (Haw. 1996) (rejecting strict
scrutiny); Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 173 (Ohio 1993) (rejecting strict scrutiny because
"there must be some limitation on the right to bear arms to maintain an orderly and safe society").
130. Cole, 665 N.W.2d at 336 (citations omitted).
131. See, e.g., Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1044 (R.I. 2004) ("Even in jurisdictions that
have declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scru-
tiny analysis has been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test .... ); Klein v. Leis, 795 N.E.2d
633, 637 (Ohio 2003) (describing the state's power to regulate weapons possession).
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III. TOWARD A REASONABLE SECOND AMENDMENT
In lieu of strict scrutiny, the state courts apply a deferential scrutiny that
requires laws merely to be "reasonable regulations" on the arms right.
Would a similar reasonableness standard be appropriate for the Second
Amendment right to bear arms? This Part argues that some form of rela-
tively deferential review that allows a considerable amount of legislative
leeway is supported by the text of the Second Amendment and the history of
the right to bear arms more generally. Moreover, structural and institutional
concerns about an assertive federal judiciary in this area further counsel in
favor of deference.
A. Text
The text of a constitutional provision rarely answers all of the legal
questions courts are called upon to answer. Perhaps nowhere is this more the
case than in the Second Amendment, as the provision's confusing wording
and grammar have for many generations clouded both the nature of the
guarantee and the extent of the limits, if any, the provision imposes on gov-
ernment. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed .' ' 32
Nevertheless, the text is the traditional starting point of any constitu-
tional interpretation. More importantly to the question of the standard of
review, the text offers a valuable insight: at least some regulation of the un-
derlying right is explicitly envisioned. The provision specifically recognizes
that the militia must be "well regulated." The extent of that regulation is not
answered by the text, but some amount of government regulation of the mi-
litia is not only acceptable but even "necessary."
According to the individual-rights reading, the Framers understood the
"Militia" to refer "to all of the people, or at least all of those treated as full
citizens of the community."' 3  In Emerson, the Fifth Circuit explained that
the "Militia" was not "some formal military group separate and distinct
from the people at large."''34 If the "Militia" is understood to be comprised
of "the people generally,"'35 outside of an organized fighting force, then the
Second Amendment would seem to permit at least some measure of legisla-
tion affecting the arms bearing of these ordinary individuals. They comprise
the militia and, as a result, are themselves subject to being "well regulated."
Indeed, there is no other way to regulate an unorganized militia comprised
132. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
133. Levinson, supra note 1, at 646-47; see also Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under
Fire: The New Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1155 (1996); Akhil Reed
Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1164 (1991).
134. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 235 (5th Cir. 2001).
135. Id.
[Vol. 105:683
Scrutinizing the Second Amendment
of the people at large than to adopt rules and requirements targeted at indi-
vidual ownership and possession.
What does the Second Amendment mean by its reference to "well regu-
lated"? Under a broad interpretation, the reference might be taken to
recognize a great deal of governmental authority to preserve public safety.
Several leading individual-rights scholars, by contrast, have argued for a
narrow reading according to which the Framers meant to allow only training
and discipline. According to this reading, a "well regulated militia" was to
the Framers "one that was well-trained and equipped; not one that was
'well-regulated' in the modem sense of being subjected to numerous gov-
ernment prohibitions and restrictions."' 3 6 Regardless of which view of
regulation is the correct one, even under the narrow reading there is some
legitimate space for government to adopt laws to enhance safe gun posses-
sion. Training and discipline does not simply happen; laws must be adopted
to ensure that the people are properly educated about guns and that the peo-
ple understand the rules governing the use of guns. Discipline implies
control, and the state disciplines individual gun users by teaching them the
rules and by punishing them for failure to obey. No doubt there is a limit to
governmental authority: "well regulated" should also be understood as a
limitation on governmental power. According to Nelson Lund, the text envi-
sions a militia that is not "overly regulated or inappropriately regulated."'
3 7
By the same token, however, a "well regulated militia" is also one that is not
under-regulated. Some measure of regulatory authority, even though its pre-
cise contours are unclear, does seem to be called for by the text.
Contrast the Second Amendment's nod to governmental authority with
the language of the neighboring First Amendment, where heightened scru-
tiny occasionally applies. Proponents of an individual right to bear arms
often call for the Second Amendment to be interpreted in the same manner
as the First Amendment.' For purposes of evaluating an appropriate stan-
dard for judicial review of legislation, the textual difference between the two
could not be starker. The First Amendment states "Congress shall make no
law"'3 9 abridging the individual rights it guarantees, whereas the Second
describes the "necessity" of a "well regulated Militia." One provision sug-
gests the invalidity of any legislation; the other invites regulation.
A relatively broad reading of the governmental power to organize, train,
and discipline the militia might also be appropriate in light of the public
safety point made earlier: government regulation of guns in modern society
is truly "necessary." No mainstream scholar of the Second Amendment de-
nies that government must have the authority to adopt legislation prohibiting
a variety of weapons (such as machine guns), requiring education and train-
ing, and restricting access to guns by irresponsible bearers (such as minors
136. Reynolds, supra note 1, at 474; see also Barnett & Kates, supra note 133, at 1209.
137. Nelson Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence: Firearms Disabilities and
Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, 4 TEx REV. L. & POL. 157, 175 (1999) (emphasis omitted).
138. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 7, at 271.
139. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
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and dangerous criminals). There is bound to be disagreement about the pre-
cise extent of governmental authority; determining the correct line is not my
goal here. It is enough for my purposes that there is a baseline agreement
that some regulation is perfectly legitimate. For a court choosing a standard
of review, then, a heightened standard that presumes, every regulation to be
unconstitutional makes no sense.
Again, the state experience is instructive. My colleague Eugene Volokh
has shown the importance of looking to the state right-to-bear-arms provi-
sions in trying to understand the Second Amendment.•40 Like the Second
Amendment, several of the state constitutions with individual rights guaran-
tees also explicitly recognize in the text a degree of regulatory authority.
Florida's constitution reads, "[tihe right of the people to keep and bear arms
in defense of themselves and of the lawful authority of the state shall not be
infringed, except that the manner of bearing arms may be regulated by
law."' 14' Georgia's constitution provides that "the General Assembly shall
have the power to prescribe the manner in which arms may be borne.'
42
Prior to 1978, Idaho's right-to-bear-arms provision not only recognized
regulation as legitimate, but commanded government to undertake it: "the
legislature shall regulate the exercise of this right by law.', 43 But such lan-
guage is hardly a condition for deferential review of gun control. The
majority of state individual-rights provisions contain no such language, yet
the courts still apply the same reasonable regulation standard.
The text of the Second Amendment recognizes a measure of governmen-
tal authority to regulate those who possess arms. In choosing a standard of
review to apply to gun control, the federal courts should look for a way to
protect the basic right to bear arms, while at the same time respecting the
text's call for legislative room to regulate guns. The Second Amendment's
nod to the propriety of some regulation suggests that courts should avoid
adopting a presumption of invalidity that might threaten or unduly discour-
age such legislative activity.
B. History
Any effort to give meaning to the Second Amendment must account for
the historical development of the right to bear arms and its place in Ameri-
can governance. For centuries, even before the Revolution, the law has
140. E.g., Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793
(1998); see also David B. Kopel, What State Constitutions Teach About the Second Amendment, 29
N. Ky. L. REV. 827, 827 (2002) ("It is well-settled that state constitutions can serve as an aid to
interpreting the federal Bill of Rights. Regarding the Second Amendment, state constitutions are
especially helpful.").
141. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 8(a).
142. GA. CONsT. art. I,§ 1,TVII.
143. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11 (amended 1978) (emphasis added). Other states with similar
language include Illinois, ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 22 ("Subject only to the police power, the right of the
individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."), and Utah, UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6
(1984) ("[N]othing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.").
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regulated gun ownership and use. Although the terminology of "gun con-
trol" is modem, the practice of arms regulation extends back deep into
Anglo-American law.
The right to bear arms with which our Founders were familiar was one
that had always been subject to regulation. English law dating back to the
twelfth century restricted where and when arms could be borne. The Statute
of Northampton, adopted in 1328, declared that "no Man great nor small"
was permitted "to come before the King's Justices, or other of the King's
Ministers ... with Force and Arms," or to "ride armed by Night nor by Day,
in Fairs, Markets."' 44 The 1689 English Bill of Rights provided that "Sub-
jects which are Protestants may have Armes for their defence Suitable to
their Condition and as allowed by Law."'45 The mention of suitability and the
allowance only of specific religious adherents to possess arms indicate that
the right was not considered absolute or immune to government oversight.
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law of England, written in 1765, also
noted that the people enjoyed a fight to bear arms "suitable to their condi-
tion and degree, and such as are allowed by law," adding that the right was
subject to "due restrictions.""
According to historians Saul Cornell and Nathan DeDino, who have re-
searched gun control in early America, "a variety of gun regulations were on
the books when individual states adopted their arms-bearing provisions and
when the Second Amendment was adopted."' 47 Among the most intrusive
form of arms regulations existing at the time of the Founding were militia
laws. These state laws required the government to keep detailed records
of which individuals possessed arms, 149 not unlike modern registration laws.
The militia laws also recognized the government's authority to require gun
owners to report for a "muster"-a gathering in which arms would be in-
spected or the men trained-under penalty of fines. 50 Some states also
required gun owners to take loyalty oaths, upon which the right to possess
firearms was contingent. ' According to a 1778 Pennsylvania law, any
144. Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328).
145. 1 W. & M., 2d sess., c. 2, § 7 (1689).
146. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 139 (Univ. of
Chicago Press, 1979) (1765).
147. Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well-Regulated Right: The Early American Origins of
Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 502 (2004). See generally SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-
REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA
(2006) (documenting early efforts to regulate guns).
148. Id. at 505. For examples of state laws regulating the militia, see Act of May 8, 1792,
1792 Conn. Pub. Acts 423; Act of July 19, 1775, ch. 1, 1776 Mass. Acts 15; Act of Apr. 3, 1778, ch.
33, 1778 N.Y. Laws 62; Act of Mar. 20, 1780, ch. 167, 1780 Pa. Laws 347; and Act of Mar. 26,
1784, 1784 S.C. Acts 68.
149. Cornell & DeDino, supra note 147, at 505; see, e.g., § 9, 1776 Mass. Acts at 18 (requir-
ing "an exact List of [each man in the] Company, and of each Man's Equipments").
150. See, e.g., § 9, 1776 Mass. Acts at 18; 1778 N.Y. Laws at 66; 1784 S.C. Acts at 68.
151. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 14, 1776, ch. 7, 1776 Mass. Acts 31; Act of Apr. 1, 1778, ch. 61,
§ 5, 1778 Pa. Laws 123, 126.
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person to "refuse or neglect to take the oath or affirmation" of loyalty to the
state was required to turn in his arms and barred from keeping any firearms
or ammunition in his "house or elsewhere."'52 At the time of the Founding,
states also regulated the storage of gunpowder and imposed limits on the
amount of ammunition a person could keep in his home.'53 A Massachusetts
law from 1783 barred the inhabitants of Boston from keeping loaded arms
in "any Dwelling House, Stable, Barn, Out-house, Ware-house, Store, Shop,
or other Building."'
54
"In the years after the adoption of the Second Amendment," Cornell and
DeDino observe, "the individual states adopted even more stringent types of
regulations .... [T]he decades after ratification ... saw increased, not de-
creased, levels of regulation."'55 In the early nineteenth century, several
states sought to preserve public safety by prohibiting or restricting the carry-
ing of concealed weapons. "6 Georgia and Tennessee criminalized the sale of
certain weapons that were easily concealed."' Other regulations on weapons
from this period include licensing laws, restrictions on where firearms could
be discharged, and compulsory militia musters)58 "If one simply looks at the
gun laws adopted in the Founding Era and early Republic," Cornell and
DeDino argue, "the evidence for robust regulation is extensive."' 9 Certainly
it would be a stretch to claim that the founding generation believed that all
weapons laws were inherently suspect and presumptively unconstitutional.
The history of the Second Amendment in particular provides little sup-
port for heightened scrutiny. During its first century, the amendment was
(like many others) moribund in the courts. In the nineteenth century, the
Supreme Court did not invalidate any laws on the basis of the Second
Amendment, and the only significant relevant cases held that the amend-
ment was not incorporated to apply against the states.16° Over the last
century, the Second Amendment has been read as lacking an individual right
to bear arms and the federal courts have upheld scores of laws against Sec-
ond Amendment challenge. Indeed, the federal courts have never used the
Second Amendment to strike down a regulation of firearms. Even if one is
152. § 5, 1778 Pa. Laws at 126; see Cornell & DeDino, supra note 147, at 506.
153. E.g., Act of June 26, 1792, ch. 10, 1792 Mass. Acts 208 (addressing the carting and
transporting of gunpowder in Boston); Act of Apr. 13, 1784, ch. 28, 1784 N.Y Laws 627 (concern-
ing the storage of gunpowder); Act of Dec. 6, 1783, ch. 104, 2 Pa. Laws 256; see also Cornell &
DeDino, supra note 147, at 510-11.
154. Act of Mar. 1, 1783, ch. 13, 1783 Mass. Acts 218.
155. Cornell & DeDino, supra note 147, at 502-505.
156. E.g., Act of Mar. 18, 1859, 1859 Ohio Laws 56 (prohibiting the carrying of concealed
weapons); Act of Feb. 2, 1838, ch. 101, 1838 Va. Acts at 76 (same); Act of Oct. 19, 1821, ch. 13,
1821 Tenn. Pub. Acts 15 (same); see also Cornell & DeDino, supra note 147, at 513.
157. See Act of Dec. 25, 1837, 1837 Ga. Laws 90; Act of Jan. 27, 1838, ch. 137, 1838 Tenn.
Pub. Acts 200.
158. Cornell & DeDino, supra note 147, at 505, 515-16.
159. Id. at 505.
160. United States v. Cruickshank, 92 U.S. 542, 542 (1875) (holding that the Second Amend-
ment did not apply to the states).
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inclined to discount at least some of this history due to the prevailing collec-
tive-rights view of the Second Amendment, the fact remains that the history
of the Second Amendment is more consistent with deferential judicial re-
view than with skeptical scrutiny.
The history of the right to bear arms has also played out at the state
level. For purposes of standards of review, the most important chapters in
this story are those dealing with legal regulation and the limits imposed by
judicial review. As noted, forty-two states currently have constitutional pro-
visions guaranteeing an individual right to bear arms. 6 ' These states also
have long histories of gun control, which the state courts have overwhelm-
ingly found to be perfectly consistent with the existence of this individual
right. This level of uniformity is itself telling, given the variety of cultures
and ideologies among the states with such constitutional guarantees. The
state practice of deferential scrutiny is considered more thoroughly below in
Part IV. At this point, it suffices to recognize that the state constitutional
doctrine on the right to bear arms is well developed and remarkably consis-
tent across states. The state practice of judicial deference is uniform and the
"reasonable regulation" standard has been applied to a vast array of different
types of gun control, almost all of which have been upheld.
For many state constitutions, the relevant "framing" period is not the
1780s, when the federal Constitution was formed, but later eras in which
state constitutions were revised and amended. But regardless of which his-
torical period the courts look to in defining the meaning of their state's
constitutional provisions, the result-deferential review-is the same. Inr • 162
Klein v. Leis, an Ohio decision upholding a law barring concealed carry,
the court looked to history to inform the choice of standard for arms regula-
tion. "Ohioans of the late nineteenth century" Klein explained, considered
the right to bear arms to be "limited."'' 63 As a result, a relatively deferential
reasonableness test, rather than heightened scrutiny, captured the appropri-
ate scope of the right. Courts interpreting even newer state constitutional
provisions also reject heightened review in favor of the reasonable regula-
tion standard. In Nebraska, for example, where the state amended its
constitution to add an individual right to bear arms in 1988, the courts nev-
ertheless rejected heightened review in a case decided the following year.' 64
Whether interpreting a new constitutional provision or one from the
founding era, the state courts have consistently chosen to apply relatively
light judicial scrutiny to gun control. In the modem era of constitutional
law-roughly since World War I-the states have come together in a rare
illustration of widespread consensus on what might otherwise be a contro-
versial, hot-button issue. No state court applies heightened scrutiny and only
161. For a very useful website providing a comprehensive listing of the state constitutional
provisions, see Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms Provisions,
http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/beararms/statecon.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2006).
162. 795 N.E.2d 633,636 (Ohio 2003).
163. Id. at 637.
164. State v. Comeau, 448 N.W.2d 595,598 (Neb. 1989).
February 20071
Michigan Law Review
a handful of state courts have invalidated any sort of gun law over the past
sixty years for violating the right to bear arms. The state legal history of the
right to bear arms unquestionably recognizes a right belonging to individu-
als, but one subject to regulation without vigorous judicial oversight. In
other areas of law, constitutional thinkers have reminded us that established
governmental traditions are to be respected in judicial interpretation.1 5 In
the context of the right to bear arms, such respect translates into adherence
to the tradition of judicial refusal to interfere with legislation imposing lim-
its on guns.
C. Structure
Structural concerns also counsel against the adoption of any form of
heightened scrutiny under the Second Amendment that significantly cuts
back legislative authority to control guns. Vigorous judicial review of gun
regulation presents serious problems of federalism, separation of powers,
and institutional competence.
A decision by the Supreme Court to apply a truly strict scrutiny to gun
control would substantially disrupt settled state law. All of the states cur-
rently use a reasonableness test, under which the courts have upheld any
number of different types of gun control. If the Second Amendment prom-
ised a stricter form of review, the existing precedents would be rendered
useless. Future gun litigation would not raise state constitutional right-to-
bear-arms claims when a claim under the federal Constitution offered a
more protective standard (and hence a better chance of victory). Second
Amendment strict scrutiny would completely displace existing state law
with a single national standard. While federal supremacy at times requires
such displacement (consider Brown v. Board of Education's antidiscrimina-
tion principle'66), extreme caution is necessary when, as in the case of the
right to bear arms, the Court would undo in one fell swoop decades of con-
sistent, uniform case law from dozens of jurisdictions in the name of
establishing a federal right already recognized at the state level.
The states are often thought of as "laboratories of democracy," meaning
that at times they should be afforded sufficient space to experiment with
various solutions to social problems without national governmental supervi-
sion. 16' Due to the collective-rights interpretation of the Second Amendment,
the federal courts have remained on the sidelines of experimentation and
debate over the constitutionally permissible scope of gun control. The vast
majority of states used that leeway to experiment with the right to bear arms.
165. E.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2722, 2752-53 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that established governmental practices of acknowledging God should inform
construction of the Establishment Clause).
166. 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
167. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country").
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The unusual thing, from the perspective of democratic experimentalism, is
that forty-two states have found themselves in the same place: a constitu-
tional right to bear arms governed by deferential scrutiny. Just as the
Supreme Court prefers to wait to rule on an issue until there is a split in the
circuits, so too would the Court be well advised not to upset a broad state
law consensus such as one finds with the right to bear arms. A single na-
tional standard of strict scrutiny would mean that the states would no longer
be free, as they are now or would be under a Second Amendment reason-
ableness review, to experiment with different levels of scrutiny and to seek
for themselves the balance between safety and weapons.
In addition to the risk of federal overreaching, a Supreme Court decision
adopting strict scrutiny would raise separation of powers concerns. Strict
scrutiny would not just disrupt settled state law, it would also call into ques-
tion a range of federal gun control laws. Congress has been regulating
firearms for over seventy years, 68 and a skeptical and rigorous form of judi-
cial scrutiny would threaten existing federal gun control. Recall that the
Ashcroft Memorandum made plain the Justice Department's view that, even
under an individual-rights construction of the Second Amendment, "all"
federal gun control laws remained constitutional. 6 9 If the Court were to ap-
ply a standard with real bite and invalidate many of those laws, the
longstanding tradition of congressional authority to regulate weapons would
be significantly curtailed.
Profound questions of institutional competence also would attach to a
Supreme Court decision to apply heightened review. In his famous article on
"underenforced constitutional norms," Larry Sager observed that courts of-
ten refuse to give full judicial protection to constitutional rights when judges
feel themselves unable "to prescribe workable standards of state conduct
and devise measures to enforce them.' 70 At the state level, the right to bear
arms is relatively underenforced by the judiciary, and a Second Amendment
right to bear arms would be a good candidate for similar treatment.'7 For
one, the questions of gun policy are complex and the adverse consequences
of judicial error are unusually great. The debates over the effectiveness of
various forms of gun control are dense, and the empirical data often con-
flicting, leaving courts understandably reluctant to engage with them.
Consider the influential study of economist John Lott, Jr., who found that
168. The National Firearms Act of 1934 has been called "the first federal gun control law"
David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L.
REv. 588, 662 (2000). That federal law is currently codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (2000).
169. Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 6.
170. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1217 (1978).
171. Brannon Denning has argued that the Second Amendment right to bear arms is just this
sort of underenforced right under current doctrine. See Brannon P. Denning, Gun Shy: The Second
Amendment as an "Underenforced Constitutional Norm," 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 719 (1998).




concealed carry laws had a strong deterrent effect on crime.' Lott's sophis-
ticated regression analyses were rebutted by resounding criticism of his
methodology, and a wave of scholarship has challenged his analysis and• 173
conclusions. Judges do not want, and are not especially competent, to sort
out such disputes and settle intensely debated issues of social science.
Granted, judges have stepped into other hotly contested, empirically debat-
able areas of law. But the consequences of erroneous judicial invalidation
with regard to gun legislation are particularly undesirable. As one commen-
tator notes, "[i]f courts demand that legislators narrow gun regulations as
narrowly as possible, they could be risking lives in the process."'
74
Traditionally, when courts perceive that an erroneous judicial decision
would pose substantial risks to public safety and security, they tend to adopt
a stance of deference rather than skepticism. An example is deference to
prison officials when they adopt regulations burdening inmates' rights in the
interest of prison safety. In most instances, the courts apply the deferential
standard of Turner v. Safley, which requires only that prison policies be
"reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives." 75 As the Supreme
Court explained in that decision, "[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of
prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously ham-
per their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative
solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration." 176 Substitute
"legislators" for "prison officials" and "gun safety" for "prison administra-
tion," and the logic of Turner's deference retains its persuasive force.
Weapons require some degree of regulation, but the problems of gun vio-
lence and crime have proven enormously difficult to solve even with
legislative flexibility and room to experiment. Second Amendment height-
ened review, if applied aggressively, could make finding those solutions
even more difficult.
Key to judicial deference in this area is the recognition that gun control
reflects a delicate balance between individuals' ability to protect themselves
and the larger collective protection that people seek from government. An
uninhibited right to bear arms without legislative limitations returns society
to the state of nature, in which each person fends for herself. Hobbes fa-
mously argued that it was precisely the dangers of such an environment that
required people to form governments and laws in the first place. 77 One chief
172. JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN-
CONTROL LAWS (1998).
173. E.g., Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue If, Shooting Down the "More Guns, Less Crime"
Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193 (2003); Mark Duggan, More Guns, More Crime, 109 J. POL.
ECON. 1086 (2001); Jens Ludwig, Concealed-Gun-Carrying Laws and Violent Crime: Evidence
from State Panel Data, 18 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 239 (1998).
174. Monks, supra note 126, at 264 n.94.
175. 482 U.S. 78, 99 (1987).
176. Id. at 89.
177. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996)
(1651).
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role of government, therefore, is to provide a collective measure of protec-
tion for all from violence and the threat of personal harm. Protection from
injury by guns and criminals using guns is part of this governmental obliga-
tion. An individual right to bear arms means that government cannot achieve
this goal through straightforward disarmament, but must instead balance the
individual's ability to defend herself against the collective need to protect all
others. Achievement of that balance requires highly complex socio-
economic calculations regarding what kinds of weapons ought to be pos-
sessed by individuals and how to limit access to them by those deemed
untrustworthy or dangerous. Such complicated multi-factor judgments re-
quire trade-offs that courts are not institutionally equipped to make.
Legislatures, by contrast, are structured to make precisely those kinds of
determinations.
The structural dilemma posed by the sudden establishment of a federal
rule of heightened scrutiny is only exacerbated by the fact that the Supreme
Court would be a newcomer to the individual-right-to-bear-arms field,
which is already heavily populated by experienced state legislatures, state
judiciaries, and the Congress. Most of the key issues in gun regulation have
been the subject of state court rulings, often by numerous states all ruling
the exact same way. For decades, and in some instances centuries, state
lawmakers have been balancing the individual right to bear arms with the
public safety concerns necessitating regulation. A "green" Court should not
lightly disregard this wealth of experience.
For institutional reasons, courts wisely tend to follow the path of other
jurisdictions that have confronted the same issue, especially when there is
widespread agreement. Indeed, state courts commonly cite the rejection of
strict scrutiny by other state courts to justify their own decision to apply
reasonableness review.' As the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained in the
Cole decision, "[wle find the precedents of other states, favoring a 'reason-
able' test, to be persuasive in the context of the right to bear arms. 'm The
Colorado Supreme Court observed that deferential review of weapons laws
was "in accordance with the vast majority of cases construing state constitu-
tional provisions."'"0 The state court tradition of deference is itself partially a
function of institutional competence concerns; all courts, from state to Su-
preme, are properly hesitant to presume the unconstitutionality of laws in an
area where there is a conceded need for governmental regulation and where
no other courts apply heightened scrutiny.
IV. THE PRACTICE OF REASON
While the analysis of text, history, and structure offered above pointed in
the direction of a relatively deferential scrutiny, it did not suggest any more
178. See, e.g., State v. Mendoza, 920 P.2d 357, 367-68 (Haw. 1996); Mosby v. Devine, 851
A.2d 1031, 1044 (R.I. 2004).
179. State v. Cole, 665 N.W.2d 328, 336 (Wis. 2003).
180. Robertson v. City of Denver, 874 P.2d 325, 329 (Colo. 1994).
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precise contours of the appropriate standard. For that, the place to look is
where the case law is rich with controversies dealing with the exact ques-
tion: state constitutional law on the right to bear arms. 8' The states have
applied a reasonable regulation test to a wide array of gun control measures,
with surprisingly little variation in reasoning or results. Oliver Wendell
Holmes famously taught that "[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience."' The American constitutional experience with the indi-
vidual right to bear arms has taken place primarily in the states. If one wants
to imagine what Second Amendment scrutiny will look like under an indi-
vidual-rights reading, state constitutional law is the place to begin.
A. The Reasonable Regulation Standard
The state constitutional practice of applying deferential review in right-
to-bear-arms cases extends back well over a century. In the late nineteenth
century, state supreme courts began asking whether gun safety regulations
were "reasonable." In State v. Shelby, '" the Missouri Supreme Court upheld
a prohibition on possession of firearms by intoxicated individuals against a
challenge under the state's constitution. While explaining that the state con-
stitution "secures to the citizen the right to bear arms in the defense of his
home, person, and property," the court argued that the "statute is designed to
promote personal security, and to check and put down lawlessness, and is
thus in perfect harmony with the constitution."' 84 "[W]e are of the opinion
the act is but a reasonable regulation of the use of... arms, and to which
the citizen must yield," the court concluded. ' In the decades since, the rea-
sonable regulation test has spread throughout the states with constitutional
provisions guaranteeing an individual right to bear arms.
The reasonable regulation test "should not be mistaken for a rational ba-
sis test,"' 116 such as that found in Equal Protection cases. 1 7 Under rational
basis review, the question is whether the law is a rational means of further-
ing legitimate governmental ends. The court applying rational basis review
does not formally consider the extent of the burden on the individual; what
181. David Kopel, one of the leading experts on the Second Amendment, has written several
excellent articles examining the state constitutional provisions guaranteeing a right to bear arms. See
Kopel, supra note 140; David B. Kopel et al., A Tale of Three Cities: The Right to Bear Arms in
State Supreme Courts, 68 TnMP. L. REv. 1177 (1995) [hereinafter Kopel et al., Three Cities]. Kopel
uses the state experience to support an individual-rights interpretation of the Second Amendment,
but does not discuss in depth how the reasonableness standard used at the state level might work in
the context of the Second Amendment. My discussion here fills this gap.
182. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard
Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
183. 2 S.W. 468 (Mo. 1886).
184. Id. at 469.
185. Id. (emphasis added).
186. State v. Cole, 665 N.W.2d 328, 338 (Wis. 2003).
187. See David B. Kopel, The Licensing of Concealed Handguns for Lawful Protection: Sup-
port from Five State Supreme Courts, 68 ALB. L. REv. 305, 315-16 (2005) (distinguishing
reasonable regulation and rational basis tests).
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matters is whether there are reasonable objectives served by the law. "The
explicit grant of a fundamental right to bear arms," courts insist, "clearly
requires something more, because the right must not be allowed to become
illusory."'88
Under the reasonable regulation test applied to gun control, the question
is whether the challenged law is a reasonable method of regulating the right
to bear arms. Even a law backed by legitimate governmental ends, though,
can burden the right too much and be unconstitutional under the reasonable
regulation test. If a state attempted to disarm its citizenry completely, such a
law might well survive rational basis review, assuming the goal is public
safety and that a rational legislator could conclude that banning all firearms
furthers public safety. Under a reasonable regulation standard, however, a
complete ban on firearms would effectively do away with the underlying
right, and, as a result, such a law could not be a reasonable regulation of the
right. The law might be a reasonable regulation of the polity or of society,
but not of the right. Ordinary forms of gun control such as licensing laws,
bans on concealed carry, and prohibitions on particular types of weapons
are, by contrast, attempts to regulate the right rather than eliminate it and are
routinely upheld. So long as a gun control measure is "not a total ban on the
right to bear arms,"'89 the courts will consider it a mere regulation of the
right. ,90
The language used in state court opinions to describe the limits of rea-
sonableness embodies the unique focus of the test used in right-to-bear-arms
cases. State courts explain that the difference between reasonable and unrea-
sonable regulation of the arms right is that any law that "eviscerates,''
renders "nugatory, "'9 or results in the effective "destruction"'' 93 of the right is
unreasonable. A law that so excessively burdens the right as to destroy it
will be invalidated. In this way, the reasonable regulation standard adopts a
categorical rule: destruction of the right, such as by disarmament, is per se
unconstitutional. In some decisions, the state courts also hold a gun law (or
its application) to be unreasonable where the law is arbitrary or irrational.
Short of nullifying the right to bear arms or being arbitrary, gun control
laws consistently survive the reasonableness test. Courts applying the rea-
sonable regulation standard go through the formal motions of identifying the
underlying governmental objectives and weighing those goals against the
burden on the individual. "[T]he reasonableness test focuses on the balance
of the interests at stake,' 9 4 one court notes. But this balancing is decidedly
188. Cole, 665 N.W.2d at 338.
189. Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1045 (R.I. 2004) (emphasis added).
190. See People v. Williams, 377 N.E.2d 285, 286-87 (Il. App. Ct. 1978).
191. State v. Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d 785, 799 (Wis. 2003).
192. Trinen v. City of Denver, 53 P.3d 754, 757 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
193. State v. Dawson, 159 S.E.2d 1, 11 (N.C. 1968); State v. McAdams, 714 P.2d 1236, 1237
(Wyo. 1986); see also State v. Comeau, 448 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Neb. 1989).
194. State v. Cole, 665 N.W.2d 328, 338 (Wis. 2003).
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tipped in favor of the government, so much so that the individual almost
never wins. The large-scale problem of violence in society, which includes
(but is not limited to) gun violence, virtually always overwhelms the indi-
vidual challenger's interest in self-defense or recreation. The burden on the
individual is usually considered to be minimal so long as there are altema-
tive means of exercising the right. According to the Ohio Supreme Court,
"any [gun control measure] imposes a restraint or burden upon the individ-
ual, but the interest of the governmental unit is, on balance, manifestly
paramount."
' 95
There has been no comprehensive empirical study of state right-to-bear-
arms cases, but the consensus in the academic literature is that approxi-
mately twenty laws have been invalidated for violating this state
constitutional right.196 But that number is somewhat deceptive; the majority
of these decisions are from the nineteenth century, predating the rise of
modern constitutionalism. Since World War II, the published opinions of the
state courts 19 7 include nine decisions invalidating laws (or the application of
laws to specific individuals) on the basis of the right to bear arms. Of those
nine, six were gun control laws. This is but a fraction of the hundreds, if not
thousands, of gun control laws enacted at the state level during this period.
Under the reasonable regulation standard, courts uphold all but the most
arbitrary and excessive laws. In thirty-six of the forty-two states with indi-
vidual right-to-bear-arms guarantees, no gun control measure has been
invalidated in over half a century under those provisions.
While there is a difference in focus between reasonable regulation and
rational basis, in ordinary practice both standards are extremely deferen-
tial.' 98 Rational basis review has been characterized as "virtually none in
fact" because nearly every law subject to it survives judicial scrutiny.' 99
Similarly, nearly all laws survive the reasonable regulation standard, thus
giving wide latitude to legislatures. As the Illinois Supreme Court noted, the
195. Mosher v. City of Dayton, 358 N.E.2d 540, 543 (Ohio 1976).
196. See Todd Barnet, Gun "Control" Laws Violate the Second Amendment, and May Lead to
Higher Crime Rates, 63 Mo. L. REv. 155, 188 n.173 (1998); Kopel et al., Three Cities, supra note
181, at 1180 n.12 (1995).
197. My research was limited to published opinions, which may undercount the actual num-
ber of cases invalidating gun laws. It is possible that some courts have invalidated laws without
publishing opinions, but these cases are hard to uncover. In any event, one supposes that the vast
majority of decisions invalidating state laws would be published, meaning that any undercount re-
sulting from relying on published opinions' alone would not be great. Nevertheless, one must
recognize the possibility that other cases exist.
198. State courts commonly use the rational basis and reasonable regulation language inter-
changeably. See, e.g., Robertson v. City of Denver, 874 P.2d 325, 331 (Colo. 1994) (requiring the
law to be "reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest such as the public health, safety,
or welfare"); Trinen v. City of Denver, 53 P.3d 754, 757 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) (referring to the
"rational basis test"); City of Chicago v. Taylor, 774 N.E.2d 22, 29 (I11. App. Ct. 2002) (requiring
the law to be "rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest").
199. Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 H-ARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
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right to bear arms is subject to "substantial infringement."20° Like rational
basis, the reasonable regulation standard tends to be, more than anything
else, shorthand for broad judicial deference.
B. The Breadth of Deference
The paucity of contemporary state court decisions invalidating laws on
the basis of the state constitutional right to bear arms illustrates the extent of
the deference afforded legislatures by the reasonable regulation standard.
Courts affirm the constitutionality of nearly any type of gun control, uni-
formly upholding bans on possession of firearms by felons; 20 1 total bans on
the possession of particular types of firearms, including short-barreled (or
11202 201 20420"sawed-off") shotguns, machine guns °, stun guns, ' assault weapons,' °5
semiautomatic weapons,206 and even handguns; 2°7 prohibitions on the carry-
ing of concealed weapons;208 bans on the transportation of loaded firearms; 2
9
bars on the possession of firearms by individuals who are intoxicated 2'° and
in places where alcohol is sold or served 2 (including private
200. Kalodimos v. Viii. of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266, 278 (III. 1984).
201. E.g., Eary v. Commonwealth, 659 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Ky. 1983); State v. Comeau, 448
N.W.2d 595,600 (Neb. 1989); State v. Smith, 571 A.2d 279, 280 (N.H. 1990); State v. Ricehill, 415
N.W.2d 481, 484 (N.D. 1987); Perito v. County of Brooke, 597 S.E.2d 311, 317, 321 (W. Va. 2004)
(upholding felon gun ban even for a felon who has been pardoned). Some of the felon possession
bans have also been challenged, unsuccessfully, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal
Constitution. E.g., People v. Jackson, 646 N.E.2d 1299, 1304-05 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
202. E.g., Carson v. State, 247 S.E.2d 68, 72 (Ga. 1978); State v. Fennell, 382 S.E.2d 231, 233
(N.C. Ct. App. 1989); Ford v. State, 868 S.W.2d 875, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
203. E.g., Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So.2d 661, 666-67 (Fla. 1972); Morrison v. State, 339
S.W.2d 529-32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960).
204. People v. Smelter, 437 N.W.2d 341, 342 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
205. E.g., Robertson v. City of Denver, 978 P.2d 156 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Benjamin v.
Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226 (Conn. 1995); Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 166-73 (Ohio
1993).
206. E.g., City of Cincinnati v. Langan, 640 N.E.2d 200, 205-06 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
207. See Kalodimos v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266, 269-73 (I11. 1984); City of
Cleveland v. Turner, No. 36126, 1977 WL 201393, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 4, 1977) (upholding
a ban on "any handgun of a .32 caliber or less and a barrel length less than 3 inches").
208. E.g., Klein v. Leis, 795 N.E.2d 633, 636-38 (Ohio 2003); State v. Cole, 665 N.W.2d 328
(Wis. 2003); State v. McAdams, 714 P.2d 1236 (Wyo. 1986).
209. E.g., City of Cape Girardeau v. Joyce, 884 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); State v.
Spencer, 876 P.2d 939, 941-42 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994); State ex rel. W. Va. Div. of Natural Res. v.
Cline, 488 S.E.2d 376 (W. Va. 1997).
210. E.g., People v. Garcia, 595 P.2d 228, 230 (Colo. 1979).
211. E.g., State v. Lake, 918 P.2d 380, 382 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).




residences);"' and criminal penalty enhancements for commission of a
crime while possessing a firearm.2 4
If one looks closely at the reasoning of the state court decisions, the
breadth of that deference becomes even clearer. As one court explained,
"[b]ecause arms pose an extraordinary threat to the safety and good order of
society, the possession and use of arms is subject to an extraordinary degree
of control. 21 Under the reasonable regulation standard, the state courts con-
sistently uphold even vastly overinclusive laws. A few examples illustrate
this phenomenon.
1. Bans on Particular Types of Weapons
State courts in the modem era have uniformly upheld state prohibitions
on particular types of guns, without requiring any legislative fact-finding to
support the bans. A Georgia sawed-off shotgun case, Carson v. State,21 6 is
typical. "[Tihe question in each [right-to-bear-arms] case," the court ex-
plained, is " 'whether the particular regulation involved is legitimate and
reasonably within the police power, or whether it is arbitrary, and, under the
name of regulation, amounts to a deprivation of the constitutional right.' ,,217
The ban on sawed-off shotguns was "not arbitrary or unreasonable" be-
cause, the court explained, such weapons are "commonly used for criminal
purposes. The court did not demand any evidence to back up the claim
that sawed-off shotguns were "commonly used" by criminals, and did not
require the government to show the prevalence of criminal use of sawed-off
shotguns as compared to non-criminal use. Despite the overinclusiveness of
the law, which applied to all law-abiding people, and the lack of supporting
fact-finding, the ban was deemed reasonable.
Bans on one type of firearm-so-called "assault weapons"-are also in-
credibly overinclusive, yet courts consistently uphold them against
challenge under the state right to bear arms.2 9 Critics of these bans note that
"[a]ppearance notwithstanding, 'assault weapons' are functionally indistin-
213. E.g., Gibson v. State, 930 P.2d 1300 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
214. E.g., State v. Blanchard, 776 So. 2d 1165 (La. 2001); State v. Schelin, 55 P.3d 632, 639
(Wash. 2002) (plurality opinion); State v. Daniel, 391 S.E.2d 90, 96-97 (W. Va. 1990). It is worth-
while to note that a defining characteristic of all the right-to-bear-arms decisions is the relatively
small amount of argument courts offer to justify their determinations of reasonableness. Their rea-
soning is often only barely spelled out, raising the suspicion that they believe that little explanation
is necessary. Such a process is typical of highly deferential review, where the conclusion that a law
is valid is based primarily on the fact of deference rather than on a careful balancing of the interests.
215. Kalodimos v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266, 269 (I11. 1984) (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
216. 247 S.E.2d 68 (Ga. 1978).
217. Id. at 72 (quoting Strickland v. State, 72 S.E. 260, 263 (Ga. 1911)).
218. Id. at73.
219. The exact type of weapons covered by the terminology of "assault weapons" varies, and
the only unifying feature of these weapons is that they share "a military-style appearance." David B.
Kopel, Clueless: The Misuse of BATF Firearms Tracing Data, 1999 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 171,
180.
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guishable from normal-looking guns: they fire only one bullet with each
press of the trigger and the bullets they fire are intermediate-sized and less
powerful than the bullets from big game rifles."'2 0 Hunting rifles are gener-
ally exempt from assault weapons bans "because they have wooden stocks
instead of black plastic and are lacking pistol grips, bayonet lugs, flash sup-
pressors, and other sinister features." If the underlying objective of gun
control in general, and bans on assault weapons in particular, is public
safety, it makes little sense for the government to ban certain dangerous-
looking guns while allowing citizens to possess other, more powerful guns.
Under any kind of heightened review that demands a tight fit between ends
and means, the assault weapons bans would be problematic. Under a defer-
ential standard, however, piecemeal legislation that leaves unregulated other
types of activity posing the same or greater dangers usually is constitution-
ally permissible.
2. Felon Possession Bans
Bans on the possession of firearms by convicted felons are the most
common type of gun control regulation, and every state court in the modem
era to rule on the constitutionality of this type of law has held that they are
reasonable. While some state courts rule that felons are categorically ex-
222
cluded from the right to bear arms -that is, they hold that felons do not
even have a right which triggers any scrutiny--even where courts hold that
felons are included within the scope of the state constitutional provisions,
223they uphold the bans as reasonable. Perhaps one should not be surprised
that courts uphold felon possession bans in light of the unsavory characters
who happen to be adversely affected by them. Nevertheless, such laws are
wildly overinclusive; many felonies are not violent in the least, raising no
particular suspicion that the convict is a threat to public safety. Perjury, se-
curities law violations, embezzlement, obstruction of justice, and a host of
other felonies do not indicate a propensity for dangerousness. It is hard to
imagine how banning Martha Stewart or Enron's Andrew Fastow from pos-
sessing a gun furthers public safety. Yet, despite this overinclusiveness, felon
possession bans are consistently, and without exception, deemed reasonable
measures of promoting public safety.
220. Id.; accord Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joseph E. Olson, In Re 101 California Street: A Legal
and Economic Analysis of Strict Liability For the Manufacture and Sale of "Assault Weapons," 8
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 41,43 (1997).
221. Gerard E. Faber, Jr., Casenote, Silveira v. Lockyer: The Ninth Circuit Ignores the Rele-
vance and Importance of the Second Amendment in Post-September I lth America, 21 T.M. COOLEY
L. REV. 75, 120 (2004).
222. E.g., State v. Hirsch, 114 P.3d 1104, 1135-36 (Or. 2005).
223. E.g., People v. Blue, 544 P.2d 385, 390-91 (Colo. 1975); Rohrbaugh v. State, 607 S.E.2d




The deference embodied by the reasonable regulation standard is further
indicated by state court decisions upholding licensing laws that give gov-
ernment officials broad discretion to reject applicants. Many states have
1 • 224"shall issue" licensing, under which the licensing official is mandated to
issue a permit to carry concealed firearms to any qualified applicant. Yet
even these laws sometimes condition the permit on vague, ambiguous quali-
fications subject to wide interpretation by licensing officials. Some states
require issuance of a gun license if the applicant is of "good character and
reputation ' ' or is a "suitable person' '226 to possess a firearm-standards that
are subjective, to say the least, and far too vague to survive strict scrutiny.
Yet the state courts hold that such discretion is appropriate with the right to
bear arms, reasoning that, if a person is indeed of good character or suitabil-
ity, the issuance is required. As the Rhode Island Supreme Court wrote in
upholding that state's mandatory licensing law, "[t]he finding that an appli-
cant is a suitable person involves an exercise of discretion," but "this leeway
does not affect the requirement that the licensing authority shall issue a
permit to a suitable person who meets the requirements set forth in the stat-
ute. 227 Although the court was not ignorant of the burden placed on the
individual by this licensing, it held that the law was reasonable because "if a
license is refused on the ground that a person is not suitable, this determina-
tion is subject to review by this Court on certiorari."228 The mere availability
of judicial review was enough to save the constitutionality of the law, de-
spite conditioning the right to bear arms on subjective, ambiguous
standards .229
C. The Limits of Reasonableness
So under what circumstances will state courts hold that a gun control
measure is unconstitutional? According to the state courts, a law is unconsti-
tutional if it destroys or renders nugatory the right. Although no right-to-
bear-arms jurisdiction has attempted to completely disarm its populace, state
courts often note that total prohibitions on gun ownership go too far and will
be invalidated. Even here, however, state courts allow felons to be com-
pletely barred from possessing firearms, and one imagines the state courts
would reach the same conclusion about minors or the mentally disabled.
Some destruction of the right through disarmament is still countenanced.
Beyond a total ban, what runs afoul of the reasonable regulation test?
224. Kopel, supra note 187, at 305 (2005).
225. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-2-3 (e)(2) (West. Supp. 2006).
226. R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-47-11(a) (2002).
227. Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1048 (R.I. 2004).
228. Id.
229. See Matthews v. State, 148 N.E.2d 334, 337 (Ind. 1958).
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As mentioned earlier, the state courts have invalidated gun control laws
or their application to particular individuals on the basis of the state right to
bear arms in only six published decisions over the past sixty years. 23 We can
break this down a bit more. The courts have invalidated only two types of
gun control laws: total bans on the transportation of any firearms for any
purpose whatsoever (three cases) and a permitting law (one case). In the
other two cases, the courts upheld the underlying law but held that the law's
application to particular individuals violated the right to bear arms in the
unusual circumstances of those controversies. Together, these six decisions
provide some insight into the limits of the reasonable regulation standard's
deference.
Courts will hold unconstitutional a gun control law (or its application to
a particular individual) only in extreme circumstances where (a) the law or
its application is so profoundly unfair as to be arbitrary and irrational, or (b)
the law or its application is so restrictive as to be effectively a destruction or
nullification of the right. These categories are not mutually exclusive and the
reasoning in the decisions often overlaps both.
In two modem-era cases, extremely unfair applications of otherwise
valid laws have been held to violate the state constitutional right to bear
arms. In State v. Rupe, the Washington Supreme Court reversed a death sen-
tence because evidence was introduced at sentencing that the convict owned
firearms.23' The prosecution had used that evidence to support the inference
that the convict was a continuing threat to the community, even though the
gun was kept at home and had not been involved in the underlying crime.
"We see no relation between the fact that someone collects guns and the
232
issue of whether they deserve the death sentence," the court explained.
Surely, this decision reaches the right conclusion: the exercise of a constitu-
tional right unrelated to the crime in question cannot be reason to impose
capital punishment. But this decision does not seriously challenge the con-
stitutionality of gun control, only a particularly inappropriate form of
prosecutorial overreaching.
In State v. Hamdan, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the convic-
tion of a liquor and grocery store owner who violated the state's ban on
concealed possession of a weapon by keeping a handgun hidden in his
store.233 The court explicitly held that the concealed weapons ban was con-
stitutional, but ruled that the unusual facts of this case made enforcement of
230. This number excludes three Oregon decisions that invalidated complete bans on weapons
other than guns. State v. Delgado, 692 P.2d 610 (Or. 1984) (possession of a switchblade); State v.
Blocker, 630 P.2d 824 (Or. 1981) (possession of billy club in public); State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94
(Or. 1980) (possession of a billy club in the home). For decisions upholding restrictions on weapons
other than firearms, see State v. Swanton, 629 P.2d 98 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (ban on nunchakus);
City of Cleveland Heights v. Allen, No. 41104, 1980 WL 354859 (Ohio Ct. App. June 26, 1980) (ban
on switchblades); and City of Seattle v. Montana, 919 P.2d 1218 (Wash. 1996) (ban on carrying
"dangerous knives," concealed or open).
231. State v. Rupe, 683 P.2d 571, 597 (Wash. 1984) (en banc).
232. Id.
233. State v. Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d 785, 812 (Wis. 2003).
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that law against this store owner "unreasonable. 234 The court emphasized
that the store was located in a very high-crime neighborhood of Milwaukee,
that the store had been the target of four armed robberies in the previous six
years (and in one of those robberies the assailant had held a loaded weapon
to the owner's head and pulled the trigger, but the gun misfired), and that
two fatal shootings had occurred inside the store in recent years.235 In this
situation, the court explained, prosecution of the store owner for keeping a
concealed weapon in his store would be "practically nullifying the right" to
use a firearm for security. 26 The alternative proposed by the prosecution-
that the store owner could keep his handgun on the counter in plain sight
next to the register-was "impractical, unsettling, and possibly dangerous"
and "fails the litmus test of common sense. 237
Three state court decisions have invalidated blanket bans on the trans-
portation of firearms, loaded or not, anytime, anywhere, and for any131
purpose. Such broad laws, the courts reasoned, were so restrictive as to
nullify the right. As the Kansas Supreme Court wrote, an individual had the
right to own a gun, but under the blanket transportation ban he could not
"lawfully transport a firearm from the place where he purchased it or had it
repaired., 239 The restriction was such, the Colorado Supreme Court argued,
that it "would prohibit gunsmiths, pawnbrokers and sporting goods storesS • ,,240
from carrying on a substantial part of their business. Indeed, by the terms
of the ordinances, an individual who moved residences had to leave the gun
behind because the gun could not be packed away unloaded in a truck and
moved to the new residence. According to a New Mexico decision, "the or-
dinance under consideration purports to completely prohibit the 'right to
bear arms.' "2' One of the three decisions suggested that that the total trans-
portation ban was not even the result of considered public policy at all, but
was due to sloppy legislative drafting.242
In light of the practical effects of a total transportation ban, these deci-
sions are not terribly surprising. Nevertheless, a sign of the breadth of the
reasonable regulation standard's deference is that several other state court
234. Id. at 790.
235. Id. at 791.
236. Id. at 809.
237. Id.
238. City of Lakewood v. Pillow, 501 P.2d 744, 745 (Colo. 1972); City of Junction City v.
Mevis, 601 P.2d 1145, 1152 (Kan. 1979); City of Las Vegas v. Moberg, 485 P.2d 737, 738 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1971).
239. Mevis, 601 P.2d at 1152.
240. Pillow, 501 P.2d at 745.
241. Moberg, 485 P.2d at 738.
242. See Mevis, 601 P.2d at 1148-49 (recognizing that the ban on any transportation appeared
to result from the potentially inadvertent omission of a provision in a prior gun control measure).
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decisions uphold the same type of law. Two decisions out of Ohio and one
from gun-friendly Texas 24 find that total transportation bans are reasonable
regulations on the right to bear arms largely because of the countervailing
need for public safety.
The last of the six contemporary cases-a West Virginia decision in
which a basic license-to-carry law was invalidated,-is an outlier with lit-
tle to teach us about the workings of the reasonable regulation standard. At
least nine other states have considered the constitutionality of such laws and
246
upheld them as reasonable. The reasoning of this isolated decision is thin,
but as best as one can tell the court's view was that no individual rights
could be made to depend upon prior authorization or permitting by the
state.27 When it comes to the right to bear arms, however, that view is far
outside the mainstream.
Taken together, the state court decisions indicate that the reasonable
regulation standard is essentially a way for the courts to "stay in the game."
Although courts do not subject gun control to skeptical review, by employ-
ing a deferential standard the courts can oversee governmental regulation of
the arms right and guard against extreme and excessive laws that effectively
eliminate the core right to bear arms. Judicial invalidation is appropriate in
extraordinary circumstances, such as when a law (or its application) works a
miscarriage of justice as in Rupe and Hamdan. By maintaining a role in gun
control law, the courts can serve as a check on the elected branches to insure
that legislation does not eliminate the basic right. If gun control laws are
excessive, the courts can break from their usual practice of deference and
provide some relief for the affected individuals. Where a law is so broad as
to make gun ownership-or at least gun purchasing and repair-illegal, the
courts insure that the underlying right is more than illusory. The reasonable
regulation standard enables the courts to act as a safety valve to counter
governmental overreaching, but does not seriously interfere with legislative
authority to regulate firearms in the interests of public safety.
One could construe the handful of state court decisions invalidating laws
(or their application) as examples of reasonableness "with bite." When ap-
plying rational basis review, which is deferential like the reasonable
regulation standard, the U.S. Supreme Court occasionally appears to give
243. State v. Enos, No. 8251, 1977 WL 198812 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1977) (upholding a
city ordinance banning the carrying of a pistol); City of Akron v. Dixon, 303 N.E.2d 923 (Akron
County Mun. Ct. 1972) (upholding law banning the carrying of a pistol).
244. Collins v. State, 501 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (upholding ban on the carrying
of a pistol).
245. State ex rel. City of Princeton v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1988).
246. Davis v. State, 146 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1962); State v. Mendoza, 920 P2d 357 (Haw. 1996);
Matthews v. State, 148 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. 1958); Dozier v. State, 709 N.E.2d 27 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999);
In re Atkinson, 291 N.W.2d 396 (Minn. 1980); Heidbrink v. Swope, 170 S.W.3d 13 (Mo. Ct. App.
2005); Mosher v. City of Dayton, 358 N.E.2d 540 (Ohio 1976); State v. Perry, 77 P.3d 313 (Or.
2003); Commonwealth v. Ray, 272 A.2d 275 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1970); Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d
1031 (R.I. 2004).
247. See Buckner, 377 S.E.2d at 144-45 (citing W. VA. CONST. art. Ill, § 22).
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that test some teeth, scrutinizing challenged laws with a more skeptical eye
241than usual. Perhaps the state courts occasionally add teeth to the reason-
able regulation standard. If so, however, the teeth soon fall out. After
invalidating one law (or its application), the courts of that particular state
quietly return to upholding firearms regulations. For example, subsequent to
overturning a blanket ban on transportation of firearms, the Colorado courts
249 250upheld a felon possession ban, a prohibition on concealed carry, and a
ban on possession by intoxicated persons.25" ' As one Colorado appellate court
reminded, heightened review is inapplicable; the reasonable regulation stan-
dard is "essentially" the same as "the rational basis test.' '2 2 The same
reversion to deference has occurred elsewhere;53 indeed, none of the states
whose decisions are discussed above have invalidated more than a single
gun control law.24 Reasonable regulation with bite, then, is more of an iso-
lated event than a lasting trend, and it appears that deference is an
equilibrium position that is quickly reestablished.
V. RECONSIDERING HEIGHTENED SECOND AMENDMENT SCRUTINY
The federal courts are certainly capable of bucking constitutional tradi-
tion and formally adopting strict scrutiny or some other variant of
heightened review in Second Amendment cases, even if this has potentially
undesirable consequences. Both United States v. Emerson 5' and the
Ashcroft Memorandum used at least some of the language of strict scru-
tiny, and a Supreme Court actively reinterpreting the Second Amendment
might just decide that the arms right warrants constitutional law's most ex-
acting standard of review or perhaps some form of intermediate scrutiny.
This Part considers what heightened review in the Second Amendment con-
text might look like and argues that, while it might require the narrowing of
some gun control laws, heightened review may ultimately devolve into a
reasonable regulation-like standard still deferential to legislatures.
248. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating a ban on homosexual
sodomy under rational basis review); City of Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(invalidating zoning decision that barred the creation of a group home for the disabled).
249. People v. Blue, 544 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1975).
250. Trinen v. City of Denver, 53 P.3d 754 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
251. People v. Garcia, 595 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1979).
252. Trinen, 53 P.3d at 757.
253. See State v. Doile, 648 P.2d 262 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982) (upholding ban on concealed carry
three years after the state supreme court invalidated a blanket transportation ban); State v. Taylor,
872 P.2d 53 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (upholding criminal penalty enhancement for possession of
weapon during commission of a crime); State v. Thomas, 683 N.W.2d 497 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004)
(upholding felon possession ban).
254. Oregon is the only state in which the courts have invalidated more than one law under the
right to bear arms over the past sixty years, and none of those decisions dealt with gun control. See
supra note 230.
255. 279 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
256. Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 6.
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A. Second Amendment Strict Scrutiny Applied
One possibility is that strict scrutiny, which has been famously charac-
terized as " 'strict' in theory but fatal in fact,' 257 would lead to judicial
invalidation of all or most gun control. Such a result would be unfortunate
for the reasons discussed earlier: gun laws are generally motivated by le-
gitimate public safety concerns rather than invidious purposes; the text of
the Second Amendment arguably characterizes regulation as "necessary";
the history of the right to bear arms at both the federal and state level recog-
nizes a constitutionally appropriate role for regulation, counseling against a
presumption of unconstitutionality; and vigorous scrutiny would present
significant federalism, separation of powers, and institutional competence
problems.
Of the two prongs in strict scrutiny analysis, the fit question is likely to
be the more significant in the context of the Second Amendment. Strict scru-
tiny's first prong-the requirement of a compelling government interest-is
likely to be found to be satisfied in nearly every case because the interest in
public safety (or some variant of that goal, such as "preventing violence" or
"reducing crime") is so obviously important. As Calvin Massey asks,
"[s]urely [public safety] is a compelling interest. What could be of much
higher priority?, 258 There may be some controversy over the first prong of
strict scrutiny analysis, however, if courts accept the view of some in the
gun-rights movement that firearms regulation is not really designed for pur-
poses of public safety but rather as an expression of animus to gun culture. 259
Yet, in light of the evident public safety concerns associated with gun pos-
session, the gun-control-as-animus argument is, charitably, somewhat far-
fetched.
Strict scrutiny's second prong-the requirement of narrow tailoring-is
more likely to pose a hurdle for gun control. Again, Massey writes, "[tihe
degree of connection between this laudable objective and the means chosen
to achieve it would likely prove to be the litigation battleground. ' 26 The fit
required by strict scrutiny could conceivably impact a number of firearms
laws.
A common concession of individual-rights theorists is to point to felon
possession bans as the types of regulation that would remain constitutional
even if the Second Amendment were reinterpreted. 26 And if there were evera type of constitutional litigant unlikely to gain the sympathy of judges, it
257. Gunther, supra note 199, at 8.
258. Massey, supra note 39, at 1132.
259. Consider the skepticism of Justice Clarence Thomas on "assault weapons" bans. Accord-
ing to Justice Thomas, this terminology is devoid of any objective meaning, being only "a political
term, developed by anti-gun publicists to expand the category of 'assault rifles' so as to allow an
attack on as many additional firearms as possible on the basis of an undefined 'evil' appearance."
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 1001 n. 16 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
260. Massey, supra note 39, at 1132.
261. Reynolds, supra note 7, at 19 (banning criminals from possessing weapons would be
constitutional under individual rights reading).
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would be convicted felons who want to bear dangerous weapons. Yet, as
noted earlier, the commonplace bans on possession of firearms by felons are
overinclusive because they permit even non-violent felons to be completely
disarmed."' By reaching felonies such as perjury and obstruction of justice,
which do not really indicate the dangerousness of the convicted felon, these
bans should be considered too broad in their reach to survive strict scrutiny.
Assault weapon bans are also arguably too imprecise to satisfy the strict
demands of heightened review because they exclude firearms of equal or
greater danger to the citizenry.
263
A recent Ninth Circuit case, Nordyke v. King, involved an overbroad law
that could be called into question under strict scrutiny analysis: a county
264ordinance that barred the possession of firearms on all county property.
The ban had the effect of preventing a gun show from being held on county
lands. 26 The law restricted the rights of law-abiding individuals without an
established factual finding that a threat to public safety existed. This is not
to say that a ban on firearms on county property is without any public safety
function; the gun shows held on county property are believed to be where
many criminals acquire their guns because the federal law requiring back-
ground checks before other gun purchases does not apply.266 Yet, there are
less restrictive alternatives to a complete ban. States could require instead
that background checks be mandatory for these gun shows (under state law)
or limit access to such shows to people with clean criminal records.
Strict scrutiny's fit requirement might require the narrowing of laws
such as the felon possession ban, assault weapons laws, county property
bans, and some other forms of gun control. Yet strict scrutiny might still
leave the core of modem gun control standing-or, indeed, might even be
effectively watered down over time such that it looks much like the reason-
able regulation standard. To find support for this hypothesis, one need only
look to the few Second Amendment cases in which litigants argued for strict
scrutiny and the federal courts, assuming arguendo that strict scrutiny might
apply, considered the constitutionality of gun control under that standard.
Both Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis267 and United States v. Miles26s in-
volved constitutional challenges to the federal ban on possession of firearms
by persons convicted of domestic violence or subject to a restraining order
in a domestic violence case. In both cases, the judges first rejected the ar-
262. See supra text accompanying notes 222-224.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 219-221.
264. Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit held that the
gun show promoter lacked standing to challenge the ban in federal court because, under the collec-
tive rights view of the Second Amendment, only states had cognizable legal harm. Id. at 1191-92.
265. Id. at 1188.
266. See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, U.S. DEP'T OF TREAS., GUN SHOWS:
BRADY CHECKS AND CRIME GUN TRACES 26 (Jan. 1999), available at http://www.atf.treas.gov/
pub/treas-pub/gun-show.pdf.
267. 13 F. Supp. 2d 811,814 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
268. 238 F. Supp. 2d 297, 298 (D. Me. 2002).
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gument that the Second Amendment protected the individual right to bear
arms and that strict scrutiny applied. But then, assuming that the amendment
did protect an individual right and that strict scrutiny was appropriate, the
judges analyzed the challenged law and upheld it. The courts ruled the gov-
ernment's interest in "preventing family violence"' 69 was compelling.
Moreover, as the Gillespie court wrote, "[t]he statute is narrowly tailored in
that it applies only to persons who have been convicted previously in a court
of law of a crime of domestic violence, and Congress cited many statistics
linking the presence of firearms to the substantial number of deaths resulting
from domestic violence disputes., 270 According to Miles, the law would
"easily survive strict scrutiny.' 27' So much for "fatal in fact."
In Emerson, in which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals unambiguously
committed to the position that the Second Amendment guaranteed an indi-
vidual right and indicated that laws burdening that right must be "narrowly
tailored,' 272 the court still upheld the law challenged in that case. That law-
the same federal ban on possession by persons subject to a restraining order
on the basis of past domestic violence that was the subject of Gillespie and
Miles-applied to the challenger in Emerson even though there was no "ex-
press judicial finding that the defendant poses a credible threat to the
physical safety of his spouse or child. 273 While a strong narrow tailoring
requirement might actually require such a showing---courts often require
evidence to support the government's claim that the underlying policy is
properly tailored 7-the court allowed this law to stand.
Perhaps even more telling is the fate of other post-Emerson challenges
to gun control in the Fifth Circuit. There have been at least three such deci-
sions, and in each one the challenged law was upheld despite the apparent
requirement of narrow tailoring. In United States v. Darrington, the Fifth
Circuit upheld the federal ban on felon possession-a law that should be
undermined by a vigorous fit requirement. 5 In United States v. Patterson,
the court upheld the federal law barring possession of a firearm by a user of
276 277a controlled substance. And in United States v. Herrera, the court upheld
the same law at issue in Patterson over a dissenting opinion that argued the
law was overbroad:
269. Id. at 303; see also Gillespie, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 827.
270. Gillespie, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 827.
271. Miles, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 303 (emphasis added).
272. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001).
273. Id. at 213.
274. E.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (requiring eviden-
tiary showing of past discrimination to justify a race-based affirmative action policy).
275. 351 F.3d 632, 633-34 (5th Cir. 2003).
276. 431 F.3d 832, 835-36 (5th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (per curiam) (deciding the case on the
grounds of evidentiary sufficiency without addressing challenges to the law).
277. 313 F.3d 882 (5th Cir. 2002).
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Given that there are more than 150 substances in the list of controlled sub-
stances in the Controlled Substances Act ... and that each of these
substances has widely varying and different effects on an individual, it
would seem elementary ... that Congress must specify the particular sub-
stances whose use may cause particular damages and injuries to an
individual sufficient to deprive that individual of his Constitutional Rights
under the Second Amendment. 78
The dissent continued, "to have a narrowly tailored restriction on Sec-
ond Amendment rights, Congress must specify the frequency of use of a
controlled substance and the time period during which such a use will be
deemed to have a continuing effect on an individual., 279 Yet the majority
disagreed and was willing to uphold the conviction.
Even proponents of heightened review for the Second Amendment right
to bear arms reject the notion that all, or even most, forms of gun control
and other weapons regulation would be unconstitutional. Nelson Lund, for
example, argues that even if heightened review is applied, "most existing
forms of gun control would survive such scrutiny because they are suffi-
ciently well tailored to achieve sufficiently worthy government purposes. 280
Massey, who argues for "semi-strict scrutiny," contends that "[a] great deal
of regulation of such an individual right can, and should, be permitted. 28t
According to Donald Dowd, "the reason gun control legislation would sur-
vive even [strict scrutiny] is the overwhelming public safety concern. In the
context of this strict scrutiny, the Court would most likely find that public
safety constitutes a compelling state interest, and legislation would pass
muster on this count."
282
Thus it is fair to predict that strict scrutiny in the context of gun regula-
tion will not be overwhelmingly fatal and might even permit most, if not all,
gun control laws to survive judicial review. In that case, many of the reasons
that counsel against applying strict scrutiny are mitigated. Still, there would
be unwelcome costs to applying strict scrutiny to gun laws if that standard
lacks the vigor with which it is usually associated. Writing about a different
area of law, Eugene Volokh has articulated sound reasons for courts to avoid
applying what they call strict scrutiny to areas of law where the standard is
truly not very strict. First, there is a "risk of confusion" as some courts
might "import the strongly rights-protective traditional strict scrutiny doc-
trine" into this other area of law where it does not belong -here, right-to-
bear-arms cases. Second, "courts might export the watered-down" version of
strict scrutiny from one area "into other cases, or, less directly, weaken strict
278. Id. at 889 (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
279. id.
280. Lund, supra note 137, at 189.
281. Massey, supra note 4, at 587.
282. Dowd, supra note 47, at 111.
283. Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REv.
1465, 1500 (1999).
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scrutiny in these other cases by diluting its formerly forceful symbolism.' 2 u
Third, "promising strict scrutiny, with its historical connotation of extreme
skepticism concerning the government action, but delivering something con-
siderably weaker diminishes courts' credibility, ' 85 To this we might add that
legislatures may be hesitant to undertake their duty to enhance public safety
by regulating weapons out of fear that strict scrutiny will in fact be fatal.
Even if legislatures know that some laws survive Second Amendment strict
scrutiny, the expected benefits of gun control would be discounted by the
probability of judicial invalidation. If the review is not rigorous, courts
should not claim to apply strict scrutiny.
B. A Brief Note on Intermediate Scrutiny
The Supreme Court could reject strict scrutiny and adopt some variation
on heightened review, such as an intermediate standard that requires only
important governmental ends (instead of compelling ones) and a substantial
fit (in lieu of a perfect one). An intermediate level of review, however, would
likely lead to only marginally different results than either strict scrutiny or
even the reasonable regulation standard.
First, the governmental ends prong of the analysis would not change:
public safety is already a compelling government interest sufficient to sat-
isfy even strict scrutiny and thus would easily satisfy intermediate scrutiny.
Second, with regard to means, there may be little distinction in practice
between "narrow tailoring" and something like "substantial relationship."
The fit is never going to be very precise in gun control, and courts will need
to accept a large measure of overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness no
matter what formal standard is applied. No law of any sort will make the
public perfectly safe, and any gun control measure could go further to make
people more safe from harm from guns. A law requiring safe storage could
do more and require safety locks; a law requiring licensing for concealed
carry could go further and ban laser sights and silencers. As Dowd recog-
nizes, "[m]ost legislation will assert broad safety concerns and broad gun
control measures to match, covering both 'good' and 'bad' gun possessors
and 'good' and 'bad' guns. Such legislation cannot be narrowly tailored to
reach only the bad people who kill with their innocent guns. 286 Moreover,
due to the intensity of public opinion on guns, legislation is inevitably the
result of hard-fought compromise in the political branches. To expect such
legislation to reflect a tight fit between ends and means is unrealistic.
Given that most laws might be expected to survive even strict scrutiny, it
is hard to imagine which cases would come out differently under an inter-
mediate standard. If the difference between the expected outcomes under
284. Id.; see also Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990)
("[Wiatering [strict scrutiny] down [in religious exemption cases] would subvert its rigor in the
other fields where it is applied... ).
285. Volokh, supra note 283, at 1501.
286. Dowd, supra note 47, at I ll.
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reasonable regulation and strict scrutiny is already small, there is not much
of a baby to split. Intermediate scrutiny might in time simply morph into
one of the extreme standards, becoming either deferential reasonableness
review or slightly more demanding strict scrutiny. Indeed, one might argue
that the handful of federal decisions from the Fifth Circuit purporting to
apply some aspect of strict scrutiny are really applying nothing more rigor-
ous than intermediate scrutiny already. Certainly, those cases do not require
a particularly close fit between ends and means.
The state cases also support the inference that intermediate scrutiny will
ultimately prove to be little more than the reasonable regulation standard.
The small handful of decisions invalidating gun laws (or their application to
particular individuals) might arguably be seen as applying a form of height-
ened scrutiny. As noted, however, such judicial skepticism does not last
long, and courts, in the end, fall back to their usual stance of deference to
legislatures when it comes to matters of public safety and firearms. If defer-
ential review is, as one might suspect from this pattern, an equilibrium
point, then Second Amendment heightened review seems likely to end up in
the same place: reasonable regulations on the right to bear arms will be up-
held as constitutionally permissible.
CONCLUSION
In an opinion in the Nordyke case, Ninth Circuit Judge Ronald Gould
strongly endorsed the view that the Second Amendment protected an indi-
vidual right to bear arms.2s7 The standard he would choose? "[A]n individual
Second Amendment right" should be "subject to reasonable government
regulation. '288
The state experience indicates that the right to bear arms in the Second
Amendment is a good candidate for the test recommended by Judge Gould.
This test is pervasive in American constitutionalism, uniformly applied at
the state level to govern the dozens of state guarantees of the individual right
to bear arms. Under this standard, the vast majority of laws burdening a
Second Amendment right to bear arms are likely to withstand judicial scru-
tiny. Laws that effectively abolish the right to possess firearms or are applied
in extraordinary factual circumstances that give rise to a sense of profound
unfairness may be called into question. But outside of those narrow areas,
an individual right to bear arms has not traditionally interfered with gun
control. The Second Amendment may receive a second look, yet the stan-
dard of review may prove much more important to the future of gun control
than the substantive construction of the underlying right. Few laws are likely
to run afoul of whatever right-individual or collective-the Second
289Amendment is read to protect.
287. Nordyke v. King, 319 E3d 1185, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 2003) (Gould, J., concurring).
288. Id. at 1197.
289. Cf Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 484-85 ("It is easy to imagine a court accepting the
individual rights approach and then upholding every likely gun restriction .... Put another way, the
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Some individual-rights scholars appear to recognize this fact and support
the individual-rights reading in large part for its symbolic or expressive ef-
fect. According to Calvin Massey, "[r]ecognition of a limited individual
right to gun possession, however, would allay the fear of gun enthusiasts (or
shooters, as they generally prefer to be called) that the ultimate aim of gun
control advocates is to stamp out private gun possession."29 To be sure, if
the Second Amendment is interpreted to guarantee an individual right to
bear arms, then a move to a British-style society with almost no lawful gun
possession would be unconstitutional. Yet such a move is not anywhere near
being politically feasible in America anyway. But if the forty-two states with
individual-arms-right guarantees are a sign, gun enthusiasts can expect little
more than a symbolic victory from a revised Second Amendment. In the
American constitutional tradition, best illustrated by state constitutional
doctrine when it comes to the right to bear arms, reasonable regulation has
long been considered appropriate. This history of deferential review under
the reasonable regulation standard is as good an indication as any that, even
if the Second Amendment is reinterpreted to protect an individual right, al-
most all gun control laws are likely to remain constitutional.
debate between the individual and collective rights approaches to the Second Amendment might be
completely irrelevant to resolving the legal issues actually likely to arise and confront courts.").
290. Massey, supra note 4, at 587; see also Reynolds, supra note 7.
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